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function . . . but we do not sit as a panel of Original Proceeding in thi* Ouirt
review on the result, absent some other
constitutional claim." Lancaster v. Utah Bd. of ATTORNEYS:
rontons, 869 P.2d 945, 947 (Utah 1994). It is James B. Lee, Barbara K. Polich and William
J. Stilling, Salt Lake City, for Petitioners
within the discretion of the Board to weigh all
the evidence before it in deciding whether to Annina Mitchell, Robert K. Hunt, and Jan
Graham, Salt Lake City, for Respondent
revoke parole.
The Board's right to rely on any factors
Before Judges Orme, Greenwood, and Wilkip=
known . . . or later adduced at the . . .
hearing, and the weight to be afforded such
factors . . . are all matters within the
This opinion is subject to revision before
discretion of the Board. They are precisely
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
•he kinds of issues that are not subject to
GREENWOOD, Judge:
judicial review under section 77-27-5(3).
Merit Electrical, et al. (Merit), petitions fr»*
Northern v. Barnes, 825 P.2d 696, 699 (Utah
App. 1992), aff'd, 870 P.2d 914 (Utah 1993). review of the order of the Division of
Judicial review by the trial court is therefore Occupational and Professional Licensing (the
limited to procedural due process violations Division) converting a citation proceeding from
committed by the Board, Foote, 808 P.2d at an informal to a formal proceeding. Because we
735, or a clear abuse of the Board's discretion, conclude that this court lacks jurisdiction to
consider Merit's petition, we do not reach the
Ward, 573 P.2d at 782.
In the present case, the trial court overstepped substantive issues.
its authority when it did not defer to the Board's
BACKGROITNP
findings and proceeded to reweigh the evidence
On December 9, 1993, the Division issued
the Board had relied upon at the revocation
hearing. The Board's decision to revoke parole citations to Merit for hiring unlicensed
was supported by evidence. Therefore, the electricians to perform electrical construction
Board did not abuse its discretion when it work at Kennecott Copper in violation of Utah
Code Ann. §58-55-2(32)(c) (1994), Citations
revoked Walker's parole.
were also issued to the unlicensed electricians.
Both Merit and the electricians contested the
CONCLUSION
The Board's decision to revoke Walker's citations. On February 11, 1994, the Division
parole was within its discretionary authority, and filed a motion to convert the citation proceedings
adjudicative
was not subject to judicial review. Accordingly, from informal to formal
the trial court's grant of the extraordinary writ proceedings.1 The motion was subsequently
approved by the Division's presiding hearing
is reversed.
officer. Merit then appealed the order converting
Russell W. Bench, Judge
the proceedings to the director of the
WE CONCUR:
Department of Commerce. The director denied
Norman H. Jnrk«»on, Judg
Merit's request for review, stating that the
Michael J. Wilkin*. Judge
Department did not have jurisdiction to hear the
request. Merit then petitioned this court foreview.
271 Liah Adv. Rep. *
IN THE
LIT All COURT OF APF

<!

MERIT
E L E C T R I C A L
&
INSTRUMENTATION, a corporation; and
Jonathan Carl Juretich; Christopher M.
Schiffman; Dan A. Johnson; and Kit
Vancss,
Petitioners,
i TAH DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
Division of Occupational and Professional
1 icensing,
Respondent,
--o. 940435 CA
FILED: August 24, 199S

ISSUES FOR REVIEW
The parties essentially raise four issues for
review: (1) Does this court have jurisdiction to
consider Merit's petition? (2) Did the Division
violate its own rules in converting the
proceedings? (3) Did the Division fail to satisfy
the statutory requirements for conversion? (4)
Does the statute allowing for conversion of
proceedings violate the Equal Protection Claus*
of the Utah and United States Constitutions?2
ANALYSIS
The Division argues that this court does noi
have jurisdiction to consider Merit's petition
because the Division's order converting the
proceedings to formal adjudicative proceeding*
was not a final order. We agree.
Whether this court has jurisdiction to hear *
petition for review presents a question of la*
Btain Hudson Frinting v. Tax Convn'n, 870
PM 291, 292 (Utah App. 1994).

v<we^©

mcrii lucerne*! ?. Ul ft Dent, or Commerce

Prove, Utah
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Both the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals have jurisdiction to review "all final
agency action resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings." Utah Code Ann. §63-d6b-16
(1993) (emphasis added); see also id.
§78-2a-3(2)(a) (Supp. 1994) (this court "has
jurisdiction to hear appeals of final orders and
decrees resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings of state agencies''). This court does
not have jurisdiction to review orders that
reserve "something for further decision by the
agency." Farkdale Care Center v. Frandsen,
837 P.2d 989, 992 (Utah App. 1992) cert,
denied 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993); see also
Shan v. Board of Review, 78 J P.2d 463,464-65
(Utah App. 1989). Thus, in Nielson v. Division
ofT.O.S.T,
851 P.2d 1201 (Utah App. 1993),
this court held that it lacked jurisdiction to
review the actions of the Division of Police
Officer Standards and Training regarding a
wildlife officer, since the Division had
conducted no formal proceedings from which the
petitioner could seek review. Id. at 1204.
Similarly, in the present case, neither formal
nor informal proceedings have occurred
regarding the merits of the contested citations.
The decision converting the proceedings is not
"final agency action" because the formal
adjudicative proceedings have yet to take place.
Therefore, the conversion decision "reserves
something to the agency for further decision."
Sloan, 781 P.2d at 464.
Nevertheless, Merit argues that this court can
consider the petition if it adopts the "Collateral
Order Doctrine." That doctrine allows review of
orders that "'conclusively determine the disputed
question, resolve an important issue completely
separate from the merits of the action, and (are)
effectively unreviewable on appeal from final
judgment.'" Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731,
742, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 2697 (1982) (citation
omitted). The doctrine is intended to allow
courts to review orders which "finally determine
claims of right separable from, and collateral to,
rights asserted in the action, too important to be
denied review and too independent of the cause
itself to require that appellate consideration be
deferred until the whole case is adjudicated."
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp,, 337
U.S. 541, 546/69 S.Ct. 1221, 1225-26 (1949).
Although judicial economy might be served in
this case if we were to adopt the doctrine, we
decline to do so. The Utah Legislature has made
its intent clear with regard to this court's
jurisdiction over appeals from administrative
agency actions. The Utah Administrative
Procedures Act provides in part that the
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals have
jurisdiction to "review all final agency action
resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings."
Utah Code. Ann. §63-46b-t6 (1993) (emphasis
added); see also id. §78-2a-3(2)(a) (Supp.
1994). Any deviation from the requirement for
final agency action must also come from the
l^e»islatnr*»

5

lv. Rep, t

CONCLUSION
Because the Division's order t^»n *»rttng citation proceedings from infonnnl to formal i
not "final agency action," ne lack jurisdiction i<
hear Merit's petition. Wo fi«nh#»r decline \?
adopt the Collateral Order Doctrine,
Pamela T. Greenwood, JudgWE CONCUR:
Gregory K. Orme, Presiding Judg *>
Michael J. Wilkins, Judge
1. Both formal and informal proceedings allow fr»'
hearings, the presentation of evidence, and written
orders However, unlike formal proceedings, infnrmnl
proceedings do y not allow, for discover)' or
intervention. See Utah Code Ann. §§63-46b-5to
10 (1993)
Moreover, appeal* from
forma'
proceedings go directly to the Supreme Court or Cour*
of Appeals while appeals from informal hearings go to
the district court for a trial de novo. See id §§63-46h
15,-16.
2. As explained earlier in this opinion, because v-e
conclude that this court lacks jurisdiction to conside*
the petition, we do not reach the remaining hsuc
regarding the conversion order
3. We note that the Collateral Order Doctrine **«
adopted hy the various courts cited in Merit v
Memorandum In Opposition To Summary Disposition
ha* be«n applied only to proceedings before trial
courts and not, as the case here, to proceedings
conducted before administrative ngenci«*s. See Dipt fa'
Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc , 62 U S L W
4457 (U.S. June 6, 1994); Moses H Cone J1o<r v
Mercury Constr Corp , 460 U.S I. 103 S Ct. 92*
(1983); Nixon v Fitzgerald, 457 U S 731, 102 S Ct
2690 (1982); Cohen v Benefictal Indus. Loan Corp
337 U S 541, 69 S C t . 1221 (1949); United States \
Deffenbaugh Indus., 957 V 2d 749 (10th Cir. 1992i
In re NewportSa\ing%andLoam
Ast'n, 928 T 2d 4"
(1st Cir. 1991); Town ofCheutpcake Beach v /Yr*«
Constr Co., 625 A.2d I<V* *•• -Q93); K «*
Ifampe, 626 A.2d 1218 (!"«•
1903)
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1

JURISDICTION AND COURT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant

to

Utah

Code

Ann.

§ 78-2a-3.

The

Third

Judicial

District Court, the Honorable John A. Rokich presiding, entered
an

order

of

dismissal

in

favor

of

defendants

Industrial

Commission of Utah Anti-discrimination Division and Felix Jensen
on April

28, 1994.

State Farm Mutual Automobile

Insurance

Company ("State Farm") filed a notice of appeal on May 26, 1994.
[This action will be hereinafter referred to as the

"Jensen

action."]
The Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable Frank G.
Noel presiding, entered an order of dismissal in favor of the
Industrial Commission of Utah Anti-discrimination Division and
Brenda Mena on May 24, 1994. State Farm filed a notice of appeal
on May 24, 1994.

[This action will hereinafter be referred to as

the "Mena action."]
The respective cases were consolidated for purposes of appeal
by an order dated July 21, 1994, issued by the Utah Court of
Appeals.
ISSUE ON APPEAL
Was State Farm required to request an evidentiary hearing
from the director of the Industrial Commission as its only method
of review of the Determination and Order issued as a result of
the informal adjudicative proceeding?
Farm

required

to

request

an

In other words, was State

evidentiary

hearing

before

the

director of the Industrial Commission or could State Farm allow
1

the informal adjudication to become a final order and then seek
a trial de novo in the district court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This

court reviews the trial court's dismissal of

State

Farm's complaint for correctness, giving no deference to the
trial court's legal conclusions.

First Sec. Bank of Utah v.

Creech, 858 P.2d 958, 963 (Utah 1993).

The same lack of defer-

ence applies to the trial court's interpretation of statutes,
which likewise pose questions of law. Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P. 2d
497, 499 (Utah 1989); Asay v. Watkins, 751 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1988).
The issue of whether an agency has issued final agency action is
reviewed independently by this court.

Parkdale Care Center v.

Frandson, 837 P.2d 989, 992 (Utah App. 1992).
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
1.

Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-

46b-l et seq., specifically Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-5, 63-46b12, 63-46b-14, 63-46b-15, 63-46b-16.
2.

Utah

Anti-discrimination

Addendum, Exhibit A.
Act,

specifically Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1.
3.

§ 34-35-1

et

seq.,

Addendum, Exhibit B.

Utah Anti-discrimination Division Administrative Rules,

R560-1 et seq.

Addendum, Exhibit C.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

State Farm

is requesting

review of the district courts'

dismissal of its complaints in both these cases on the basis that
State Farm failed to exhaust its administrative remedies.

2

After

informal

investigations

were

conducted

by

the

Industrial Commission in both actions, which resulted in findings
adverse to State Farm, State Farm elected to allow the informal
decisions of the Industrial Commission to become final agency
actions and then seek a trial de novo in the district courts
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15.

In dismissing State

Farm's complaint in both actions, the district courts held that
State Farm had not exhausted

its administrative

remedies by

requesting an evidentiary hearing which was available to it and
thereafter requesting an intra-agency review of the results of
that evidentiary hearing as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 34-357.1.
State Farm contends that the district courts erred in their
interpretation

of

construe

statute

this

Utah

Code Ann.

§ 34-35-7.1

so

give

as

to

by

effect

failing

to

the

to

Utah

Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l et seq.
The statutory scheme embodied in the Utah Anti-discrimination Act
and the Utah Administrative Procedures Act sets forth two options
for a party who is adversely affected by an informal adjudicative
decision.

The first option is to seek an agency evidentiary

hearing and thus convert the informal adjudication to a formal
adjudication.
administrative

The

second

process

and

option
request

is
a

to
trial

opt

out

of

the

de novo

in

the

district court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15.

The

district courts in both actions held that the second option did
not exist.

This conclusion is erroneous because it ignores the
3

Administrative

Procedures

Act

and

focuses

solely

on

the

provisions of the Utah Anti-discrimination Act, thus failing to
harmonize the provisions of both statutory schemes.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The specific facts applicable to both cases which have been
consolidated for purposes of appeal are set forth below.
A.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n of
Utah Anti-Discrimination Division and Felix Jensen
1.

On March 23, 1993, Felix Jensen filed a request for

agency action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(1).
07.]

The Commission performed an investigation.

§ 34-35-7.1(3).
according

to

[R.

Utah Code Ann.

The proceedings were conducted informally and
the

rules

enacted

under

the

Administrative

Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l et seq. and the Antidiscrimination Act, § 34-35-1 et seq., the proceeding was an
informal proceeding as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4(l).
[R. 07-011]
2.
uncovered

The investigator
sufficient

for the Commission claimed to have

evidence

to

support

allegations

of

discriminatory or prohibited employment practice. Utah Code Ann.
§ 34-35-7.1(5)(a).

In accordance with recommendations of the

investigator, the Commission issued a Determination and Order on
July 15, 1993, finding that State Farm had violated the Utah
Anti-discrimination Act.

[R. 07-011; 012-013]

4

3.

In the July 15, 1993, order, the Commission provided the

following notice of State Farm's right of administrative or
judicial review as required by Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-5(1)(i):
As per § 34-35-7.1(5) (c) , U.C.A., the nonprevailing party may make a written request to
the Director for an evidentiary hearing to
review de novo the Director's Determination
and Order. . . .
Such request must be
submitted within thirty (30) days of the date
of the issuance of the order.
If the director receives no timely request for
hearing, this order becomes the final order of
the Commission with no further right of appeal
as specified in § 34-35-7.1(5)(d).
[R. 013]
4.

State Farm did not request an evidentiary hearing to

review de novo the director's Determination and Order.

Any such

request was due August 14, 1993.
5.

On August 14, 1993, the Order and Determination became

a final appealable order of the Commission.

The order was not a

final order of the Commission until the time for requesting an
evidentiary hearing had expired.1

'Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(5) provides as follows:
(5)(a)
If the initial attempts at
settlement
are
unsuccessful
and
the
investigator
uncovers
sufficient
evidence
during his investigation to support the
allegations of a discriminatory or prohibited
employment practice set out in the request for
agency action, the investigator shall formally
report these findings to the director.
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's
report the director may issue a determination
and order based on the investigator's report.
5

6.

On September 13, 1993, State Farm filed a petition for

judicial review in the Third Judicial District Court of the final
agency action.
7.

[R. 02-014]

The petition was filed within thirty (30) days after the

Order and Determination became a final order of the Commission.
8.

On September 23, 1993, the Commission filed a motion to

dismiss State Farm's complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(2) and for
failure to timely file the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-14(3).
9.

[R. 017-023]

The Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable John A.

Rokich presiding, granted the Commission's motion to dismiss by
an order dated April 28, 1994 holding that State Farm had failed
to exhaust the administrative remedies provided by Utah Code Ann.
§ 34-35-7.1, and that therefore the court lacked jurisdiction
over the subject matter of State Farm's complaint.

[R. 0112-

0117; Addendum, Exhibit D]
10.
1994.

State Farm filed a timely notice of appeal on May 26,
[R. 0119-0120]
(c) A party may file a written reguest
to the director for an evidentiary hearing to
review de novo the director's determination
and order within 30 days of the date of the
determination and order.
(d) If the director receives no timely
reguest for a hearing, the determination and
the order received by the director reguiring
the respondent to cease any discriminatory or
prohibited employment practice and to provide
relief to the aggrieved party becomes the
final order of the commission.
6

B.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Indus, Comm'n of
Utah Anti-Discrimination Division and Brenda Mena
1.

On March 2, 1993, Brenda Mena filed a request for agency

action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(1).
Commission performed an investigation.
7.1(3).

[R. 07]

The

Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-

The proceedings were conducted informally and according

to the rules enacted under the Administrative Procedures Act,
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l et seq. and the Anti-discrimination
Act, Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-1 et seq., the proceeding was an
informal proceeding as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4(l).
[R. 07-020]
2.

The investigator for the Commission

uncovered

sufficient

discriminatory
7.1(5)(a).

evidence

to

support

employment practice.
In

accordance

with

claimed to have

allegations

of

a

Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-

the

recommendation

of

the

investigator, the Commission issued a Determination and Order on
July

6,

1993, that

discrimination Act.
3.

State

Farm

had

violated

the Utah

Anti-

[R. 07-020; 021-022]

In the July 6, 1993, Order, the Commission provided the

following notice of

State Farm's

right of administrative

or

judicial review as required by Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-5(1)(i) :
If a party wishes to appeal this Order, a
written request for a formal hearing must be
filed with the Director of the Division within
thirty (30) days from the date of the issuance
of this order as specified in Section 34-357.1(4)(c), U.C.A., and Administrative Rule
R560-1-4.A.3 and 4. . . .
If the director
receives no timely request for a hearing, this
order
becomes
the
final
order
of
the

7

Commission with no further rights of appeal as
specified in Section 34-35-7.1(4)(d), U.C.A.
[R. 022]
4.

State Farm did not request an evidentiary hearing to

review de novo the Director's Determination and Order.

Such a

request was due August 5, 1993.
5.

On August 5, 1993, the Order and Determination became a

final appealable order of the Commission.

The order was not a

final order of the Commission until the time for requesting an
evidentiary hearing had expired.
6.

Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(5).

On September 1, 1993, State Farm filed a petition for

judicial review of the final agency action in the Third Judicial
District Court.
7.

[R. 02-023]

The petition was filed within thirty (30) days after the

Order and Determination became a final order of the Commission.
8.

On September 23, 1993, the Commission filed a motion to

dismiss State Farm's complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(2) and for
failure to timely file the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-14(3).

[R. 028-034]

Brenda Mena also filed a motion to

dismiss on the same basis on November 13, 1993.
9.

[R. 091-099]

By an order dated May 24, 1994, the trial court granted

the defendant's motion

to dismiss.

[R. 0138-144; Addendum,

Exhibit E]
10.
1994.

State Farm filed a timely notice of appeal on June 2,
[R. 0149-150]
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1 specifies the investigatory and
adjudicative

procedures

to

be

utilized

by

the

Industrial

Commission, Anti-discrimination Division in investigating and
processing a charge of discrimination.

Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-

7.1(l)-(5) sets forth the framework for an informal adjudicative
proceeding following a charge of discrimination.

After the in-

formal adjudicative process is complete, and after the Commission
has entered a Determination and Order relative to the charge of
discrimination, an adversely affected party seeking to contest
the Determination and Order has the option of (1) requesting an
evidentiary hearing and thereby converting the process into a
formal adjudicative proceeding, or

(2) allowing the informal

adjudicative Determination and Order to become a final order and
thereafter seek a trial de novo in the district court. Utah Code
Ann. § 34-35-7.1(5).

Here, both trial courts erred in holding

that State Farm failed to exhaust its administrative remedies by
not requesting an evidentiary hearing before the Industrial Commission prior to seeking a trial de novo in the district court.
Appellees also argue that State Farm's respective appeals to
the district court were not timely.

However, under both the

Administrative Procedures Act and the Utah Anti-discrimination
Act, State Farm was not able to appeal to the district court
until the agency action became final. An order and determination
does not become a final order of the Commission until 30 days
after it is issued.

Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7 . 1 ( 4 )( c)-(d) . State
9

Farm timely appealed from the final agency actions by filing its
petitions for judicial review within 30 days after the orders
became final orders of the Commission.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
STATE FARM WAS ENTITLED TO SEEK A TRIAL DE NOVO IN THE
DISTRICT COURTS AFTER THE INFORMAL ADJUDICATIVE PROCESS
SPECIFIED IN UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-35-7.1(l)-(5) RESULTED
IN A FINAL ORDER.
The resolution of this appeal involves the interpretation and
interrelation of provisions of the Utah Anti-discrimination Act,
§ 34-35-1 et seq., the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah
Code Ann. § £°

*t seq., and the Utah Anti-discrimination

Division Admi.. ,. ^auive Rules, R 560-1 et seq.

The issue before

this Court is whether a party who receives an adverse Determination and Order pursuant to the informal adjudicative process set
forth at Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(1)-(5) is permitted to allow
that order to become a final order, and then seek de novo review
in the district court or whether that party's appellate review is
limited to an evidentiary hearing before the agency.
Utah

Code

Ann.

§ 34-35-7.1

sets

applicable to a discrimination claim.

forth

the

This code section provides

in pertinent part:
34-35-7.1.

Procedure for aggrieved person to
file claim —
Investigations
—
Adjudicative
proceedings
—
Settlement — Reconsideration —
Determination.
•k

"k "k

10

procedure

(4) (a) If the initial attempts at settlement are unsuccessful, and the investigator
uncovers insufficient evidence during his
investigation to support the allegations of a
discriminatory
or
prohibited
employment
practice set out in the request for agency
action, the investigator shall formally report
these findings to the director.
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's
report, the director may issue a determination
and order for dismissal of the adjudicative
proceeding.
(c) A party may make a written request
to the director for an evidentiary hearing to
review de novo the director's determination
and order within 30 days of the date of the
determination and order for dismissal.
(d) If the director receives no timely
request for a hearing, the determination and
order issued by the director becomes the final
order of the commission.
(5) (a) If the initial attempts at settlement are unsuccessful and the investigator
uncovers
sufficient
evidence
during
his
investigation to support the allegations of a
discriminatory
or
prohibited
employment
practice set out in the request for agency
action, the investigator shall formally report
these findings to the director.
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's
report the director may issue a determination
and order based on the investigator's report.
(c) A party may file a written request
to the director for an evidentiary hearing to
review de novo the director's determination
and order within 30 days of the date of the
determination and order.
(d) If the director receives no timely
request for a hearing, the determination and
order issued by the director requiring the
respondent to cease any discriminatory or
prohibited employment practice and to provide
relief to the aggrieved party becomes the
final order of the commission.
11

The procedures set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7 .1 (1)-(5)
are specifically defined as informal adjudicative proceedings.
R. 560-1-3(f)2

In both the Mena and Jensen actions, State Farm

complied with the procedures specified in Utah Code Ann. § 34-357.1(l)-(5). After an adverse Determination and Order was entered
against State Farm, State Farm allowed the 30-day time period
specified

in Utah

Code Ann.

§ 34-35-7.1(5)

to expire

which

resulted in the Determination and Order becoming a final order of
the Commission.

At that point, State Farm requested a trial de

novo pursuant to the requirements of the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15, which provides in
pertinent part:
63-46b-15.
Judicial review —
judicative proceedings.

Informal ad-

(1) (a) The district courts shall have
jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all
final agency actions resulting from informal
adjudicative proceedings, except that the
juvenile court shall have jurisdiction over
all state agency actions relating to removal
or placement decisions regarding children in
state custody. [Emphasis added]
Clearly,
conjunction

the
and

Anti-discrimination
harmonized

with

the

Act,
Utah

when

read

in

Administrative

Procedures Act, sets forth a statutory scheme which gives an

2

F.
CLASSIFICATION OF PROCEEDINGS FOR PURPOSE OF UTAH
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT. Pursuant to Section 63-46b-4(l),
U.C.A., the procedures specified in Section 34-35-7.1(1)-(5),
U.C.A., are an informal process with no hearing and are governed by
Section 63-46b-5, U.C.A.
Any settlement conferences scheduled
pursuant to Section 34-35-7.1(3)(a), U.C.A., are not adjudicative
hearings.
12

adversely

affected

party

two options

in respect

further review of the Determination and Order.

to

seeking

First, the party

can choose to allow the Determination and Order to become a final
order and seek a trial de novo in the district court pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15.
in both actions.

This is the option State Farm chose

In the alternative, the adversely affected

party can request an evidentiary hearing and convert the informal
process into a formal adjudicative hearing.
Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1 (6)-(10) sets forth the formal
adjudicative process which is available to a party following an
adverse determination in the informal adjudicative process set
forth

at

Utah

provisions

of

Code

Ann.

§ 34-35-7.1 (1)-(5) /

the Anti-discrimination

Act

The

setting

specific

forth

the

formal adjudicative process are as follows:
34-35-7.1.

Procedure for aggrieved person to
file claim —
Investigations
—
Adjudicative
proceedings
—
Settlement — Reconsideration —
Determination.
•k

"k "k

(6) In any adjudicative proceeding, the
investigator who investigated the matter may
not participate in a hearing except as a
witness, nor may he participate in the
deliberations of the presiding officer.

;

Utah Anti-discrimination Division Administrative Rule R560-1-5
provides in pertinent part:
The adjudicative proceeding referred to in Section 34-357.1(6)-(10), U.C.A., is a formal adjudicative hearing
13

(7) Prior to commencement of an evidentiary hearing, the party filing the request
for agency action may reasonably and fairly
amend any allegation, and the respondent may
amend its answer.
Those amendments may be
made during or after a hearing but only with
permission of the presiding officer.
(8) (a) If upon all the evidence at a
hearing, the presiding officer finds that a
respondent has not engaged in a discriminatory
or prohibited employment practice, the presiding officer shall issue an order dismissing
the request for agency action containing the
allegation of a discriminatory or prohibited
employment practice.
(b) the presiding officer may order that
the respondent be reimbursed by the complaining party for his attorney's fees and costs.
(9)
If upon all the evidence at the
hearing, the presiding officer finds that a
respondent has engaged in a discriminatory or
prohibited employment practice, the presiding
officer shall issue an order requiring the
respondent to cease any discriminatory or
prohibited employment practice and to provide
relief to the complaining party, including
reinstatement, back pay and benefits, and
attorneys' fees and costs.
(10) Conciliation between the parties is
to be urged and facilitated at all stages of
the adjudicative process.
Thus it is clear that both informal and formal adjudicative
proceedings are provided for in Utah Code Ann. § 35-34-7.1.

In

granting both defendants' motions to dismiss, the district courts
in essence held that the informal adjudicative procedures set
forth at Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7. 1 (1)-(5) were merely

pre-

requisites to a mandatory formal adjudicative process set forth
at Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7 . 1 ( 6 )-(10 ) . The trial courts erred in
this conclusion.
14

In setting forth a party's options in respect to appealing an
adverse Determination and Order issued in the informal adjudicative proceeding, Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(5)(c)-(d) provides as
follows:
(c)

A party may file a written request to the
director for an evidentiary hearing to
review de novo the director's determination and order within 30 days of the date
of
the
determination
and
order,
[Emphasis added]

(d)

If the director receives no timely
request for hearing, the determination
and
order
issued
by
the
director
requiring a respondent to cease any
discriminatory or prohibited employment
practice and to provide relief to the
aggrieved party becomes a final order of
the Commission.

This code provision unambiguously provides that the decision
to request an evidentiary hearing is optional.

If a voluntary

evidentiary hearing is not requested, the Determination and Order
issued

as

a result

of

becomes a final order.

the

informal

adjudicative

proceeding

This final order is therefore subject to

judicial review as specified in Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 and
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15.'
4

These sections provide as follows:

63-46b-14.
Judicial
administrative remedies.

review

—

Exhaustion

of

(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of
final agency action, except in actions where judicial
review is expressly prohibited by statute.
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after
exhausting all administrative remedies available, except
that:
15

(a) a party seeking judicial review need not
exhaust administrative remedies if this chapter or
any other statute states that exhaustion is not
required;
(b)
the court may relieve a party seeking
judicial review of the requirement to exhaust any
or all administrative remedies if:
(i)
the
inadequate; or

administrative

remedies

are

(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result
in irreparable harm disproportionate to the
public
benefit
derived
from
requiring
exhaustion.
(3)(a)
A party shall file a petition for
judicial review of final agency action within 30
days after the date that the order constituting the
final agency action is issued or is considered to
have been issued under Subsection 63-46b-13(3)(b).
(b) The petition shall name the agency and
all other appropriate parties as respondents and
shall meet the form requirements specified in this
chapter.
63-46b-15.
Judicial review
adj udicative proceedings.

—

Informal

(l)(a) The district courts have jurisdiction
to review by trial de novo all final agency actions
resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings,
except that the juvenile courts have jurisdiction
over all state agency actions relating to removal
or placement of children in state custody and
actions relating to the support of those children
as determined administratively under Section 78-3a49.
(b)
Venue for judicial review of informal
adjudicative proceedings shall be as provided in
the statute governing the agency or, in the absence
of such a venue provision, in the county where the
petitioner resides or maintains his principal place
of business.
16

The Industrial Commission argues that State Farm is precluded
from seeking a trial de novo in the district court because it did

(2)(a)
The petition for judicial review of
informal adjudicative proceedings shall be a
complaint governed by the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure and shall include:
(i) the name and mailing address of the
party seeking judicial review;
(ii) the name and mailing address of the
respondent agency;
(iii) the title and date of the final
agency action to be reviewed, together with a
duplicate copy, summary, or brief description
of the agency action;
(iv) identification of the persons who
were parties in the informal adjudicative
proceedings that led to the agency action;
(v) a copy of the written agency order
from the informal proceeding;
(vi) facts demonstrating that the party
seeking judicial review is entitled to obtain
judicial review;
(vii) a request for relief, specifying
the type and extent of relief requested; and
(vii) a statement of the reasons why the
petitioner is entitled to relief.
(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings
in the district court are governed by the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
(3)(a)
The district court, without a jury,
shall determine all questions of fact and law and
any
constitutional
issue
presented
in
the
pleadings.
(b)
The Utah Rules of Evidence apply
judicial proceedings under this section.
17

in

not exhaust its administrative remedies.
46b-15.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-

As stated previously, the governing statutes do not

suggest that a written request to the director for an evidentiary
hearing to review de novo the director's Determination and Order
is a mandatory pre-requisite to judicial review of the informal
adjudicative proceeding.

The language of the statute clearly

states that the request for an evidentiary hearing is optional.5
If a request for an evidentiary hearing is filed pursuant to
the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(5), the proceeding
is converted from an informal adjudicative proceeding to a formal
adjudicative

proceeding.

After

conversion

to

a

formal

adjudicative proceeding, the only judicial review available to an
aggrieved party is through the Utah Supreme Court or the Utah
Court of Appeals.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16.

Once a request

for an evidentiary hearing is timely filed and the proceeding is
converted from an informal adjudicative proceeding to a formal
adjudicative proceeding, there is no way for a party to obtain
district court review.

To require State Farm to request an

evidentiary hearing with the agency, in effect nullifying the
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 and Utah Code Ann. § 6346b-15, deprives State Farm of its right to pursue the district
court route of review of the agency determination and order.

5

"A party may file a written request to the director for an
evidentiary hearing to review de novo the director's determination
and order within 30 days of the date of the determination and
order." [Emphasis added] Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(5)(c).
18

In Heinecke v. Dept. of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459 (Utah App.
1991), the Utah Court of Appeals addressed whether a party was
required to exhaust administrative remedies.

Although Heinecke

involved a formal adjudicative process, the court's reasoning is
instructive

to

the

resolution

of

the

instant

action.

In

Heinecke, the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing
argued that the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies

because

he

did

not

seek

review

of

the

Division's

determination by the head of the Department of Commerce.
In finding that the plaintiff did not need to seek review of
the Division's determination prior to obtaining judicial review,
the Utah Court of Appeals examined Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12 and
held as follows:
[N]o provision in the statutes governing the
Division appears to provide for review beyond
the divisional level as contemplated in
Section 12(1)(a) of UAPA, which review would
in any case be optional so as not to defeat
finality for the purposes of judicial review
given the "permanent" and "may" usages of the
section, nor is any mandatory review provided
for as contemplated in Section 12(3).
Id. at 463.
State Farm exhausted all administrative remedies applicable
to the informal adjudicative process.

If State Farm was required

to exhaust all administrative remedies by requesting an evidentiary hearing before the Commission, the proceeding would have
become a formal proceeding, rendering the statute relating to
judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings meaningless
and thereby creating a conflict between the Anti-discrimination
19

Act and the Administrative Procedures Act.

Utah law is clear

that "when the construction of an act will bring it into serious
conflict with another act," the court has a duty to "construe the
acts to be in harmony and to avoid conflicts."

Sullivan v.

Scoular Grain Company of Utah, 853 P.2d 877, 881 (Utah 1993);
Jerez

v.

Salt

Lake

County,

822

P.2d

770, 773

(Utah

1991)

the

Anti-

[citations omitted].
The

district

discrimination

Act

courts'

interpretation

essentially

informal adjudicative procedures
§ 34-35-7.l(l)-(5)f
Ann. § 63-46b-15.

reads

out

of
of

existence

the

specified in Utah Code Ann.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14, and Utah Code
It is an elementary principle of statutory

construction that a statute should be construed as a whole giving
effect to all of its provisions.

Under the district courts'

interpretation, all Anti-discrimination agency actions must be
formal adjudications and judicially reviewable only as provided
in Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16.

To so hold totally voids and

holds for naught the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 and
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15 and deprives a party of the right to
ever have an informal adjudicative order reviewed by the district
court.

This is clearly not what the statutes contemplate.

court should give effect to the entire statutory scheme.

20

This

POINT II.
STATE FARM'S APPEALS WERE TIMELY FILED WITH THE DISTRICT
COURTS.
In

the

proceedings

below,

the

defendants/appellees

argued that State Farm's appeals were untimely.

also

Although the

trial courts' dismissal of State Farm's petitions were not based
on this argument, State Farm feels compelled to briefly address
this issue.

State Farm filed petitions for judicial review of

the final agency actions within 30 days after the Order and
Determinations became final orders of the Commission.

State Farm

was statutorily unable to appeal to the district court prior to
the expiration of the 30-day period because, before then, the
orders did not constitute final agency action.
Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(5)(c)-(d) specifically provides as
follows:
(c) A party may file a written request
to the director for an evidentiary hearing to
review de novo the director's determination
and order within 30 days of the date of the
determination and order.
(d) If the director receives no timely
request for a hearing, the determination and
order issued by the director requiring the
respondent to cease any discriminatory or
prohibited employment practice and to provide
relief to the aggrieved party becomes the
final order of the commission.
This section of the statute clearly states that an informal
adjudicative order becomes final 30 days after it is issued if no
timely request for an evidentiary hearing is made.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15(1)(a) provides as follows:

21

The district courts have jurisdiction to
review by trial de novo all final agency
actions resulting from informal adjudicative
proceedings, except that the juvenile courts
have jurisdiction over all state agency
actions relating to removal or placement of
children in state custody in actions relating
to the support of those children as determined
administratively under § 78-3a-49.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a) provides:
A party shall file a petition for judicial
review of final agency action within 30 days
after the date that the order constituting the
final agency action is issued or is considered
to have been issued under Subsection 63-46b13(3)(b).
The

provisions

of

Utah

Code

Ann.

§ 34-35-7.1

and

the

provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 and § 63-46b-15 can
easily be harmonized

by construing Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-

14(3)(a) to mean that the petition for review of final agency
action must be filed within 30 days after the order constituting
the final agency action "becomes final." By doing so, this court
gives full effect to the Utah Anti-discrimination Act (Utah Code
Ann.

§ 34-35-1

et

seq.) as v/ell as

the Utah

Administrative

Procedures Act (Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l et seq.).

The district

courts did not do so and in effect read out of existence the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act provisions relating to judicial
review by the district court of informal administrative orders.
State Farm could not appeal to the district court until the
agency action became final.

The Order and Determination in both

cases did not become final orders until 30 days had elapsed.
Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(5)(d).
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State Farm timely appealed

from the final agency action by filing its petitions for judicial
review within 30 days after the Orders became final orders of the
Commission.

As such, State Farm's appeals were in all respects

timely and in accordance with all statutory reguirements.
CONCLUSION
For the above-stated reasons, State Farm hereby reguests that
this court reverse the district courts' dismissal of State Farm's
complaint in both the Jensen and the Mena actions and remand both
cases for trials de novo
DATED this

3L3

in the district court.
day of December, 1994.
STRONG & HANNI

^<^r
nni ^-J
Robert L. Janicki
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
.!06S40nh
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I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the
foregoing Brief of State Farm were mailed, first class postage
prepaid, this ^ ^

day of December, 1994, to the following:

EVAN A. SCHMUTZ
DAVID G. TURCOTTE
3319 N. University Avenue
Jamestown Square, Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84604
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellees
DANIEL S. SAM
889 N. Freedom Blvd., Suite 102
Provo, Utah 84604
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellees
ALLAN HENNEBOLD
SHARON J. EBLEN
P. O. Box 14660
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6600
Attorneys ( or Defendant/Appellee
Industrial Commission
Felix Jensen
2060 Brewer
Salt Lake City, Utah 84
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ADDENDUM

EXHIBIT A
UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT,
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46b-l, et seq.

CHAPTER 46b
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT
Section
63-46b-0.5.
63-46b-l.
63-46b-2.
63-46b-3.
63-46b-4.

63-46b-5.
63-46b-6.

63-46b-7.

63-46b-8.

63-46b-9.

Short title.
Scope and applicability of chapter.
Definitions.
Commencement of adjudicative
proceedings.
Designation of adjudicative proceedings as informal — Standards — Undesignated proceedings formal.
Procedures for informal adjudicative proceedings.
Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings — Responsive pleadings.
Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings — Discovery
and subpoenas.
Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings — Hearing
procedure.
Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings — Intervention.

Section
63-46b-10.
63-46b-ll.
63-46b-12.
63-46b-13.
63-46b-14.
63-46b-15.
63-46b-16.
63-46b-17.
63-46b-18.
63-46b-l ( J.
63-46b-20.
63-46b-21.
G3-46b-22.

290

Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings — Orders.
Default.
Agency review — Procedure.
Agency review — Reconsideration.
Judicial review — Exhaustion
of administrative remedies.
Judicial review — Informal adjudicative proceedings.
Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings.
Judicial review — Type of relief.
Judicial review — Stay and
other temporary remedies
pending final disposition.
Civil enforcement.
Emergency adjudicative proceedings.
Declaratory orders.
Transition procedures.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT

63-46b-l

63-46b-0.5. Short title.
This act is known as the "Administrative Procedures Act."

63-46b-l.

Scope and applicability of chapter.

(1) Except as set forth in Subsection (2), and except as otherwise provided by
a statute superseding provisions of this chapter by explicit reference to this
chapter, the provisions of this chapter apply to every agency of the state and
govern:
(a) all state agency actions that determine the legal rights, duties,
privileges, immunities, or other legal interests of one or more identifiable
persons, including all agency actions to grant, deny, revoke, suspend,
modify, annul, withdraw, or amend an authority, right, or license; and
(b) judicial review of these actions.
(2) This chapter does not govern:
(a) the procedures for making agency rules, or the judicial review of
those procedures or rules;
(b) the issuance of any notice of a deficiency in the payment of a tax, the
decision to waive penalties or interest on taxes, the imposition of and
penalties or interest on taxes, or the issuance of any tax assessment,
except that this chapter governs any agency action commenced by a
taxpayer or by another person authorized by law to contest the validity or
correctness of those actions;
(c) state agency actions relating to extradition, to the granting of
pardons or parole, commutations or terminations of sentences, or to the
rescission, termination, or revocation of parole or probation, to actions and
decisions of the Psychiatric Security Review Board relating to discharge,
conditional release, or retention of persons under its jurisdiction, to the
discipline of, resolution of grievances of, supervision of, confinement of, or
the treatment of inmates or residents of any correctional facility, the Utah
State Hospital, the Utah State Developmental Center, or persons in the
custody or jurisdiction of the Division of Mental Health, or persons on
probation or parole, or judicial review of those actions:
(d) state agency actions to evaluate, discipline, employ, transfer, reassign, or promote students or teachers in any school or educational
institution, or judicial review of those actions:
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(e) applications for employment and internal personnel actions within
an agency concerning its own employees, or judicial review of those
actions;
(f) the issuance of any citation or assessment under Title 35, Chapter 9,
Utah Occupational Safety and Health Act, and Title 58, Chapter 55, Utah
Construction Trades Licensing Act, except that this chapter governs any
agency action commenced by the employer, licensee, or other personauthorized by law to contest the validity or correctness of the citation or
assessment;
(g) state agency actions relating to management of state funds, the
management and disposal of school and institutional trust land assets,
except that this chapter governs any agency's final action commenced by
any person pursuant to Section 65A-1-7, and contracts for the purchase or
sale of products, real property, supplies, goods, or services by or for the
state, or by or for an agency of the state, except as provided in those
contracts, or judicial review of those actions;
(h) state agency actions under Title 7, Chapter 1, Article 3, Powers and
Duties of Commissioner of Financial Institutions; and Title 7, Chapter 2,
Possession of Depository Institution by Commissioner; Title 7, Chapter 19,
Acquisition of Failing Depository Institutions or Holding Companies; and
Title 63, Chapter 30, Utah Governmental Immunity Act, or judicial review
of those actions;
(i) the initial determination of any person's eligibility for unemployment benefits, the initial determination of any person's eligibility for
benefits under Title 35, Chapter 1, Workers' Compensation, and Title 35,
Chapter 2, Utah Occupational Disease Act, or the initial determination of
a persons unemployment tax liability;
(j) state agency actions relating to the distribution or award of monetary grants to or between governmental units, or for research, development, or the arts, or judicial review of those actions;
(k) the issuance of any notice of violation or order under Title 26,
Chapter 8, Utah Emergency Medical Services System Act; Title 19,
Chapter 2, Air Conservation Act; Title 19, Chapter 4, Safe Drinking Water
Act; Title 19, Chapter 5, Water Quality Act; Title 19, Chapter 6, Part 1,
Solid and Hazardous Waste Act; Title 19, Chapter 6, Part 4, Underground
Storage Tank Act; or Title 19, Chapter 6, Part 7, Used Oil Management
Act, except that this chapter governs any agency action commenced by any
person authorized by law to contest the validity or correctness of the notice
or order;
(1) state agency actions, to the extent required by federal statute or
regulation to be conducted according to federal procedures;
(m) the initial determination of any person's eligibility for government
or public assistance benefits;
(n) state agency actions relating to wildlife licenses, permits, tags, and
certificates of registration;
(o) licenses for use of state recreational facilities; and
(p) state agency actions under Title 63, Chapter 2, Government Records
Access and Management Act, except as provided in Section 63-2-603.
(3) This chapter does not affect any legal remedies otherwise available to:
(a) compel an agency to take action; or
(b) challenge an agency's rule.
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(4) This chapter does not preclude an agency, prior to the beginning of an
adjudicative proceeding, or the presiding officer during an adjudicative proceeding from:
(a) requesting or ordering conferences with parties and interested
persons to:
(i) encourage settlement;
(ii) clarify the issues;
(hi) simplify the evidence;
(iv) facilitate discovery; or
(v) expedite the proceedings; or
(b) granting a timely motion to dismiss or for summary judgment if the
requirements of Rule 12(b) or Rule 56, respectively, of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure are met by the moving party, except to the extent that the
requirements of those rules are modified by this chapter.
(5) (a) Declaratory proceedings authorized by Section 63-46b-21 are not
governed by this chapter, except as explicitly provided in t h a t section.
(b) Judicial review of declaratory proceedings r^thorized by Section
63-46b-21 are governed by this chapter.
(6) This chapter does not preclude an agency from enacting rules affecting
or governing adjudicative proceedings or from following any of those rules, if
the rules are enacted according to the procedures outlined in Title 63, Chapter
46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, and if the rules conform to the
requirements of this chapter.
(7) (a) If the attorney general issues a written determination that any
provision of this chapter would result in the denial of funds or services to
an agency of the state from the federal government, the applicability of
those provisions to that agency shall be suspended to the extent necessary
to prevent the denial.
(b) The attorney general shall report the suspension to the Legislature
at its next session.
(8) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to provide an independent
basis for jurisdiction to review final agency action.
(9) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to restrict a presiding officer,
for good cause shown, from lengthening or shortening any time period
prescribed in this chapter, except those time periods established for judicial
review.
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63-46b-2.

Definitions-

(1) As used in this chapter:
(a) "Adjudicative proceeding" means an agency action or proceeding
described in Section 63-46b-l.
(b) "Agency" means a board, commission, department, division, officer,
council, office, committee, bureau, or other administrative unit of this
state, including the agency head, agency employees, or other persons
acting on behalf of or under the authority of the agency head, but does not
mean the Legislature, the courts, the governor, any political subdivision
of the state, or any administrative unit of a political subdivision of the
state.
(c) "Agency head" means an individual or body of individuals in whom
the ultimate legal authority of the agency is vested by statute.
(d) "Declaratory proceeding" means a proceeding authorized and governed by Section 63-46b-21.
(e) "License" means a franchise, permit, certification, approval, registration, charter, or similar form of authorization required by statute.
(f) "Party" means the agency or other person commencing an adjudicative proceeding, all respondents, all persons permitted by the presiding
officer to intervene in the proceeding, and all persons authorized by statute or agency rule to participate as parties in an adjudicative proceeding.
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(g) "Person" means an individual, group of individuals, partnership,
corporation, association, political subdivision or its units, governmental
subdivision or its units, public or private organization or entity of any
character, or another agency.
(h) (i) "Presiding officer" means an agency head, or an individual or
body of individuals designated by the agency head, by the agency's
rules, or by statute to conduct an adjudicative proceeding. —
(ii) If fairness to the parties is not compromised, an agency may
substitute one presiding officer for another during any proceeding,
(iii) A person who acts as a presiding officer at one phase of a
proceeding need not continue as presiding officer through all phases
of a proceeding.
(i) "Respondent" means a person against whom an adjudicative proceeding is initiated, whether by an agency or any other person.
(j) "Superior agency" means an agency required or authorized by law to
review the orders of another agency.
(2) This section does not prohibit an agency from designating by rule the
names or titles of the agency head or the presiding officers with responsibility
for adjudicative proceedings before the agency.

63-46b-3. Commencement of adjudicative proceedings.
(1) Except as otherwise permitted by Section 63-46b-20, all adjudicative
proceedings shall be commenced by either:
(a) a notice of agency action, if proceedings are commenced by the
agency; or
(b) a request for agency action, if proceedings are commenced by persons other than the agency.
(2) A notice of agency action shall be filed and served according to the
following requirements:
(a) The notice of agency action shall be in writing, signed by a presiding officer, and shall include:
(i) the names and mailing addresses of all persons to whom notice
is being given by the presiding officer, and the name, title, and mailing address of any attorney or employee who has been designated to
appear for the agency;
(ii) the agency's file number or other reference number;
(iii) the name of the adjudicative proceeding;
(iv) the date that the notice of agency action was mailed;
(v) a statement of whether the adjudicative proceeding is to be
conducted informally according to the provisions of rules adopted
under Sections 63-46b-4 and 63-46b-5, or formally according to the
provisions of Sections 63-46b-6 to 63-46b-ll;
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(vi) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be formal, a statement that
each respondent must file a written response within 30 days of the
mailing date of the notice of agency action;
(vii) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be formal, or if a hearing is
required by statute or rule, a statement of the time and place of any
scheduled hearing, a statement of the purpose for which the hearing
is to be held, and a statement that a party who fails to attend or
participate in the hearing may be held in default;
(viii) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be informal and a hearing
is required by statute or rule, or if a hearing is permitted by rule and
may be requested by a party within the time prescribed by rule, a
statement that the parties may request a hearing within the time
provided by the agency's rules;
(ix) a statement of the legal authority and jurisdiction under
which the adjudicative proceeding is to be maintained;
(x) the name, title, mailing address, and telephone number of the
presiding officer; and
(xi) a statement of the purpose of the adjudicative proceeding and,
to the extent known by the presiding officer, the questions to be
decided,
(b) When adjudicative proceedings are commenced by the agency, the
agency shall:
(i) mail the notice of agency action to each party;
(ii) publish the notice of agency action, if required by statute; and
(iii) mail the notice of agency action to any other person who has a
right to notice under statute or rule.
(3) (a) Where the law applicable to the agency permits persons other than
the agency to initiate adjudicative proceedings, that person's request for
agency action shall be in writing and signed by the person invoking the
jurisdiction of the agency, or by his representative, and shall include:
(i) the names and addresses of all persons to whom a copy of the
request for agency action is being sent:
(ii) the agency's file number or other reference number, if known;
(iii) the date that the request for agency action was mailed;
(IV) a statement oi the legal authority and jurisdiction under
which agency action is requested;
(v) a statement of the relief or action sought from the agency: and
(vi) a statement of the facts and reasons forming the basis for relief
or agency action.
(b) The person requesting agency action shall file the request with the
agency''and shall send a copy by mail to each person known to have a
direct interest in the requested agency action.
(c) An agency may, by rule, prescribe one or more printed forms
eliciting the information required by Subsection (3)(a) to serve as the
request for agency action when completed and filed by the person requesting agency action. .
(d) The presiding'officer shall promptly review a request for agency
action and shall:'
(i) notify the requesting party in writing that the request is
granted and that the adjudicative proceeding is completed:
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(ii) notify the requesting party in writing that the request is denied and, if the proceeding is a formal adjudicative proceeding, that
the party may request a hearing before the agency to challenge the
denial; or
(iii) notify the requesting party that further proceedings are required to determine the agency's response to the request,
(e) (i) Any notice required by Subsection (3)(d)(ii) shall contain the
information required by Subsection 63-46b-5(l)(i) in addition to disclosure required by Subsection (3)(d)(ii) of this section.
(ii) The agency shall mail any notice required by Subsection (3)(d)
to all parties, except that any notice required by Subsection (3)(d)(iii)
may be published when publication is required by statute.
(iii) The notice required by Subsection (3)(d)(iii) shall:
(A) give the agency's file number or other reference number;
(B) give the name of the proceeding;
(C) designate whether the proceeding is one of a category to be
conducted informally according to the provisions of rules enacted
under Sections 63-46b-4 and 63-46b-5, with citation to the applicable rule authorizing that designation, or formally according to
the provisions of Sections 63-46b-6 to 63-46b-ll;
(D) in the case of a formal adjudicative proceeding, and where
respondent parties are known, state that a written response
must be filed within 30 days of the date of the agency's notice if
mailed, or within 30 days of the last publication date of the
agency's notice, if published;
(E) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be formal, or if a hearing is to be held in an informal adjudicative proceeding, state the
time and place of any scheduled hearing, the purpose for which
the hearing is to be held, and that a party who fails to attend or
participate in a scheduled and noticed hearing may be held in
default;
(F) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be informal, and a hearing is required by statute or rule, or if a hearing is permitted by
rule and may be requested by a party within the time prescribed
by rule, state the parties' right to request a hearing and the time
within which a hearing may be requested under the agency's
rules; and
(G) give the name, title, mailing address, and telephone number of the presiding officer.
" ".•
(4) When initial agency determinations or actions are not governed by this
chapter, but agency and judicial review of those initial determinations or
actions are subject to the provisions of this chapter, the request for agency
action seeking review must be filed with the agency within the time prescribed by the agency's rules.
(5) For designated classes of adjudicative proceedings, an agency may, by
rule, provide for a longer response time than allowed by this section, and may
provide for a shorter response time if required or permitted by applicable
federal law.
(6) Unless the agency provides otherwise by rule or order, applications for
licenses filed under authority of Title 32A, Chapters 3, 4, and 5, are not
considered to be a request for agency action under this chapter.
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63-46b-4. Designation of adjudicative proceedings as informal — Standards — Undesignated proceedings formal.
(1) The agency may, by rule, designate categories of adjudicative proceedings to be conducted informally according to the procedures set forth in rules
enacted under the authority of this chapter if:
(a) the use of the informal procedures does not violate any procedural
requirement imposed by a statute other than this chapter;
—
(b) in the view of the agency, the rights of the parties to the proceedings will be reasonably protected by the informal procedures;
(c) in the view of the agency, the agency's administrative efficiency will
be enhanced by categorizations; and •
(d) the cost of formal adjudicative proceedings outweighs the potential
benefits to the public of a formal adjudicative proceeding.
(2) Subject to the provisions of Subsection (3), all agency adjudicative proceedings not specifically designated as informal proceedings by the agency's
rules shall be conducted formally in accordance with the requirements of this
chapter.
(3) Any time before a final order is issued in any adjudicative proceeding,
the presiding officer may convert a formal adjudicative proceeding to an informal adjudicative proceeding, or an informal adjudicative proceeding to a formal adjudicative proceeding if:
(a) conversion of the proceeding is in the public interest; and
(b) conversion of the proceeding does not unfairly prejudice the rights
of any party.
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63-46b-5. Procedures for informal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) If an agency enacts rules designating one or more categories of adjudicative proceedings as informal adjudicative proceedings, the agency shall, by
rule, prescribe procedures for informal adjudicative proceedings that include
the following:
(a) Unless the agency hv rule provides for and requires a response, no
answer or other pleading responsive to the allegations contained in the
notice of agency action or the request for agency action need be filed.
(b) The agency shall hold a hearing if a hearing is required by statute
or rule, or i( a hearing is permitted by rule and is requested by a party
within the time prescribed by rule.
(c) In any hearing, the parties named in the notice of agency action or
in the request for agency action shall be permitted to testify, present
evidence, and comment on the issues.
(d) Hearings will be held only after timely notice to all parties.
(e) Discovery is prohibited, but the agency may issue subpoenas or
other orders to compel production of necessary evidence.
(0 All parties shall have access to information contained in the
agency's files and to all materials and information gathered in any investigation, to the extent permitted by law.
(g) Intervention is prohibited, except t h a t the agency may enact rules
permitting intervention where a federal statute or rule requires that a
state permit intervention.
(h) All hearings shall be open to all parties.
(i) Within a reasonable time after the close of an informal adjudicative
proceeding, the presiding officer shall issue a signed order m writing that
states the following:
(i) the decision;
(ii) the reasons for the decision;
(iii) a notice of any right of administrative or judicial review available to the parties", and
(iv) the time limits for filing an appeal or requesting a review.
(j) The presiding officer's order shall be based on the facts appearing in
the agency's files and on the facts presented in evidence at any hearings.
(k) A copy of the presiding officer's order shall be promptly mailed to
each of the parties.
(2) (a) The agency may record any hearing.
(b) Any party, at his own expense, may have a reporter approved by the
agency prepare a transcript from the agency's record of the hearing.
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(3) Nothing in this section restricts or precludes any investigative right or
power given to an agency by another statute.

63-46b-6. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings
— Responsive pleadings.
(1) In all formal adjudicative proceedings, unless modified by rule according to Subsection 63-46b-3(5), the respondent, if any, shall file and serve a
written response signed by the respondent or his representative within 30
days of the mailing date or last date o( publication o[ the notice of agency
action or the notice under Subsection 63-46b-3(3)(d), which shall include:
(a) the agency's file number or other reference number;
(b) the name of the adjudicative proceeding;
(c) a statement of the relief that the respondent seeks;
(d) a statement of the facts; and
(e) a statement summarizing the reasons that the relief requested
should be granted.
(2) The response shall be filed with the agency and one copy shall be sent by
mail to each party.
(3) The presiding officer, or the agency by rule, may permit or require
pleadings in addition to the notice of agency action, the request for agency
action, and the response. All papers permitted or required to be filed shall be
filed with the agency and one copy shall be sent by mail to each party.

63-46b-7. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings
— Discovery and subpoenas.
(1) In formal adjudicative proceedings, the agency may, by rule, prescribe
means of discovery adequate to permit the parties to obtain all relevant information necessary to support their claims or defenses. If the agency does not
enact rules under this section, the parties may conduct discovery according to
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(2) Subpoenas and other orders to secure the attendance of witnesses or the
production of evidence in formal adjudicative proceedings shall be issued by
the presiding officer when requested by any party, or may be issued by the
presiding officer on his own motion.
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(3) Nothing in this section restricts or precludes any investigative right or
power given to an agency by another statute.

63-46b-8. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings
— Hearing procedure,
(1) Except as provided in Subsections 63-46b-3(d)(i) and (n), in all formal
adjudicative proceedings, a hearing shall be conducted as follows(a) The presiding officer shall regulate the course of the hearing to
obtain full disclosure of relevant facts and to afford all the parties reasonable opportunity to present their positions
(b) On his own motion or upon objection by a party, the presiding officer:
(1) may exclude evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly
repetitious;
(n) shall exclude evidence privileged in the courts of Utah;
(in) may receive documentary evidence in the form of a copy or
excerpt if the copy or excerpt contains all pertinent portions of the
original document,
(IV) may take official notice of any facts that could be judicially
noticed under the Utah Rules of Evidence, of the record ot other
proceedings before the agencv, and of technical or scientific (acts
within the agency's specialized knowledge
(c) The presiding officer may not exclude evidence solely because it is
hearsay
(d) The presiding officer shall afford to all parties the opportunity to
present evidence, argue, respond, conduct cross-examination, and submit
rebuttal evidence
(e) The presiding officer may give persons not a party to the adjudicative proceeding the opportunity to present oral or written statements at
the hearing
(f) Al] testimony presented at the hearing, if offered as evidence to be
considered in reaching a decision on the merits, shall be given under oath
(g) The hearing shall be recorded at the agency's expense
(h) Any party, at his own expense, may have a person approved by the
agency prepare a transcript of the hearing, subject to any restrictions that
the agency is permitted by statute to impose to protect confidential information disclosed at the hearing
(1) All hearings shall be open to all parties
(2) This section does not preclude the presiding officer from taking appropriate measures necessary to preserve the integrity of the hearing
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63-46b-9. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings
— Intervention.
(1) Any person not a party may file a signed, written petition to intervene
in a formal adjudicative proceeding with the agency. The person who wishes
to intervene shall mail a copy of the petition to each party. The petition shall
include:
(a) the agency's file number or other reference number;
(b) the name of the proceeding;
(c) a statement of facts demonstrating that the petitioner's legal rights
or interests are substantially affected by the formal adjudicative proceeding, or that the petitioner qualifies as an intervenor under any provision
of law; and
(d) a statement of the relief that the petitioner seeks from the agency.
(2) The presiding officer shall grant a petition for intervention if he determines that:
(a) the petitioner's legal interests may be substantially affected by the
formal adjudicative proceeding; and
(b) the interests of justice* and the orderly and prompt conduct of the
adjudicative proceedings will not be materially impaired by allowing the
intervention.
(3) (a) Any order granting or denying a petition to intervene shall be in
writing and sent by mail to the petitioner and each party.
(b) An order permitting intervention may impose conditions on the
intervener's participation m the adjudicative proceeding that are necessary for a just, orderly, and prompt conduct of the adjudicative proceeding.
(c) The presiding officer may impose the conditions at any time after
the intervention.
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63-46b-10. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings — Orders.
In formal adjudicative proceedings:
(1) Within a reasonable time after the hearing, or after the filing of any
post-hearing papers permitted by the presiding officer, or within the time
required by any applicable statute or rule of the agency, the presiding
officer shall sign and issue an order that includes:
(a) a statement of the presiding officer's findings of fact based exclusively on the evidence of record in the adjudicative proceedings or
on facts officially noted;
(b) a statement of the presiding officer's conclusions of law;
(c) a statement of the reasons for the presiding officer's decision;
(d) a statement of any relief ordered by the agency;
(e) a notice of the right to apply for reconsideration;
(f) a notice of any right to administrative or judicial review of the
order available to aggrieved parties; and
(g) the time limits applicable to any reconsideration or review.
(2) The presiding officer may use his experience, technical competence,
and specialized knowledge to evaluate the evidence.
(3) No finding of fact that was contested may be based solely on hearsay evidence unless that evidence is admissible under the Utah Rules of
Evidence.
(4) This section does not preclude the presiding officer from issuing
interim orders to:
(a) notify the parties of further hearings;
(b) notify the parties of provisional rulings on a portion of the
issues presented; or
(c) otherwise provide for the fair and efficient conduct of the adjudicative proceeding.
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Default,

(1) The presiding officer may enter an order of default against a party if:
(a) a party in an informal adjudicative proceeding fails to participate in
the adjudicative proceeding;
(b) a party to a formal adjudicative proceeding fails to attend or participate in a properly scheduled hearing after receiving proper notice; or
(c) a respondent in a formal adjudicative proceeding fails to file a response under Section 63-46b-6.
(2) An order of default shall include a statement of the grounds for default
and shall be mailed to all parties.
(3) (a) A defaulted party may seek to have the agency set aside the default
order, and any order in the adjudicative proceeding issued subsequent to
the default order, by following the procedures outlined in the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.
(b) A motion to set aside a default and any subsequent order shall be
made to the presiding officer.
(c) A defaulted party may seek agency review under Section 63-46b-12,
or reconsideration under Section 63-46b-13, only on the decision of the
presiding officer on the motion to set aside the default.
(4) (a) In an adjudicative proceeding begun by the agency, or in an adjudicative proceeding begun by a party that has other parties besides the
party in default, the presiding officer shall, after issuing the order of
default, conduct any further proceedings necessary to complete the adjudicative proceeding without the participation of the party in default and
shall determine all issues in the adjudicative proceeding, including those
affecting the defaulting party.
(b) In an adjudicative proceeding that has no parties other than the
agency and the party in defaXilt, the presiding officer shall, after issuing
the order of default, dismiss the proceeding.

63-46b-12.

Agency r e v i e w — P r o c e d u r e .

ll) (a) If a statute or the agency's rules permit parties to any adjudicative
proceeding to seek review of an order by the agency or by a superior
agency, the aggrieved party may file a written request for review within
30 days after the issuance of the order with the person or entity designated for that purpose by the statute or rule,
(b) The request shall:
(i) be signed by the party seeking review;
(ii) state the grounds for review and the relief requested;
dii) state the date upon which it was mailed; and
(iv) be sent by mail to the presiding officer and to each party.
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(2) Within 15 days of the mailing date of the request for review, or within
the time period provided by agency rule, whichever is longer, any party may
file a response with the person designated by statute or rule to receive the
response. One copy of the response shall be sent by mail to each of the parties
and to the presiding officer.
(3) If a statute or the agency's rules require review of an order by the
agency or a superior agency, the agency or superior agency shall review the
order within a reasonable time or within the time required by statute or the
agency's rules.
(4) To assist in review, the agency or superior agency may by order or rule
permit the parties to file briefs or other papers, or to conduct oral argument.
(5) Notice of hearings on review shall be mailed to all parties.
(6) (a) Within a reasonable time after the filing of any response, other
filings, or oral argument, or within the time required by statute or applicable rules, the agency or superior agency shall issue a w-ritten order on
review.
(b) The order on review shall be signed by the agency head or by a
person designated by the agency for that purpose and shall be mailed to
each party.
(c) The order on review shall contain:
(i) a designation of the statute or rule permitting or requiring review;
di) a statement of the issues reviewed;
(iii) findings of fact as to each of the issues reviewed;
(iv) conclusions of law as to each of the issues reviewed;
(v) the reasons for the disposition;
(vi) whether the decision of the presiding officer or agency is to be
affirmed, reversed, or modified, and whether all or any portion of the
adjudicative proceeding is to be remanded;
(vii) a notice of any right of further administrative reconsideration
or judicial review available to aggrieved parties; and
(viii) the time limits applicable to any appeal or review.
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63-46b-13. Agency review — Reconsideration.
(1) (a) Within 20 days after the date that an order is issued for which
review by the agency or by a superior agency under Section 63-46b-12 is
unavailable, and if the order would otherwise constitute final agency
action, any party may file a written request for reconsideration with the
agency, stating the specific grounds upon which relief is requested.
(b) Unless otherwise provided by statute, the filing of the request is not
a prerequisite for seeking judicial review of the order.
(2) The request for reconsideration shall be filed with the agency and one
copy shall be sent by mail to each party by the person making the request.
(3) (a) The agency head, or a person designated for that purpose, shall issue
a written order granting the request or denying the request.
(b) If the agency head or the person designated for that purpose does
not issue an order within 20 days after the filing of the request, the
request for reconsideration shall be considered to be denied.
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63-46b-14. Judicial review — Exhaustion of administrative remedies.
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency action,
except in actions where judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute.
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administrative remedies available, except that:
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust administrative
remedies if this chapter or any other statute states that exhaustion is not
required;
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the requirement to exhaust any or all administrative remedies if:
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm disproportionate to the public benefit derived from requiring exhaustion.
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency action
within 30 days after the date that the order constituting the final agency
action is issued or is considered to have been issued under Subsection
63-46b-13(3)(b).
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all other appropriate parties as respondents and shall meet the form requirements specified in this
chapter.
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63-46b-15. Judicial review — Informal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) (a) The distnct courts have jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all
final agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings,
except that the juvenile courts have jurisdiction over all state agency
actions relating to removal or placement of children in state custody and
actions relating to the support of those children as determined administratively under Section 78 3a-49
(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings shall
be as provided in the statute governing the agency or, m the absence of
such a venue provision, in the county where the petitioner resides or
maintains his principal place of business
(2) (a) The petition for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings
shall be a complaint governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and
shall include
(I) the name and mailing address of the party seeking judicial
review,
(n) the name and mailing address of the respondent agency,
(m) the title and date of the final agency action to be reviewed,
together with a duplicate copy summary, or brief description of the
agency action,
(IV) identification of the persons who were parties in the informal
adjudicative proceedings that led to the agencv action
(v) a cop> of the written agencv order fiom the informal proceeding,
<vi) facts demonstrating that the party seeking judicial review is
entitled to obtain judicial review
(vu) a request for relief, specifying the type and extent of relief
requested, and
(vni) a statement ot the reasons why the petitioner is entitled to
relief
(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in the district court are
governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(3) (a) The district court, without a jury, shall determine all questions of
fact and law and any constitutional issue presented in the pleadings
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply injudicial proceedings under this
section
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63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a pptition for review of
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court.
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, except that.
(a) all parties to the leview proceedings ma\ stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organ]/e the record,
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of prepaung transcripts and
copies for the record
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(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure;
(0 the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
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63-46b-17. Judicial review — Type of relief.
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudicative proceedings by the
district court or the review of formal adjudicative proceedings by an appellate court, the court may award damages or compensation only to the
extent expressly authorized by statute.
(b) In granting relief, the court may:
(i) order agency action required by law;
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discretion as required by law;
(iii) set aside or modify agency action;
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of agency action; or
(v) remand the matter to the agency for further proceedings.
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of final agency action are reviewable by a'higher court, if authorized by statute.

313

63-46b-18. Judicial review — Stay and other temporary
remedies pending final disposition,
(1) Unless precluded by another statute, the agency may grant a stay of its
order or other temporary remedy during the pendency of judicial review, according to the agency's rules.
(2) Parties shall petition the agency for a stay or other temporary remedies
unless extraordinary circumstances require immediate judicial intervention.
(3) If the agency denies a stay or denies other temporary remedies requested by a party, the agency's order of denial shall be mailed to all parties
and shall specify the reasons why the stay or other temporary remedy was not
granted.
(4) If the agency has denied a stay or other temporary remedy to protect the
public health, safety, or welfare against a substantial threat, the court may
not grant a stay or other temporary remedy unless it finds that:
(a) the agency violated its own rules in denying the stay; or
(b) (i) the party seeking judicial review is likely to prevail on the
merits when the court finally disposes of the matter;
(n) the party seeking judicial review will suffer irreparable injury
without immediate relief;
(m) granting relief to the party seeking review will not substantially harm other parties to the proceedings; and
(IV) the threat to the public health, safety, or welfare relied upon
by the agency is not sufficiently serious to justify the agency's action
under the circumstances.

63-46b-19. Civil enforcement.
(1) (a) In addition to other remedies provided by law, dn agencv mav seek
enforcement oi an order by seeking civil enforcement in the district
courts
(b) The action seeking civil enforcement of an agencv's order must
name, as defendants, each alleged violator against whom the agency
seeks to obtain civil enforcement
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(c) Venue for an action seeking civil enforcement of an agency's order
shall be determined by the requirements of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(d) The action may request, and the court may grant, any of the following:
(i) declaratory relief;
(ii) temporary or permanent injunctive relief;
(iii) any other civil remedy provided by law; or
(iv) any combination of the foregoing.
(2) (a) Any person whose interests are directly impaired or threatened by
the failure of an agency to enforce an agency's order may timely file a
complaint seeking civil enforcement of that order, but the action may not
be commenced:
(i) until at least 30 days after the plaintiff has given notice of his
intent to seek civil enforcement of the alleged violation to the agency
head, the attorney general, and to each alleged violator against
whom the petitioner seeks civil enforcement;
(ii) if the agency has filed and is diligently prosecuting a complaint
seeking civil enforcement of the same order against the same or a
similarly situated defendant; or
(iii) if a petition for judicial review of the same order has been filed
and is pending in court.
(b) The complaint seeking civil enforcement of an agency's order must
name, as defendants, the agency whose order is sought to be enforced, the
agency that is vested with the power to enforce the order, and each alleged violator against whom the plaintiff seeks civil enforcement.
(c) Except to the extent expressly authorized by statute, a complaint
seeking civil enforcement of an agency's order may not request, and the
court may not grant, any monetary payment apart from taxable costs.
(3) In a proceeding for civil enforcement of an agency's order, in addition to
any other defenses allowed by law, a defendant may defend on the ground
that:
(a) the order sought to be enforced was issued by an agency without
jurisdiction to issue the order;
(b) the order does not apply to the defendant;
(c) the defendant has not violated the order; or
(d) the defendant violated the order but has subsequently complied.
(4) Decisions on complaints seeking civil enforcement of an agency's order
are reviewable in the same manner as other civil cases.

63-46b-20. Emergency adjudicative proceedings.
(1) An agency may issue an order on an emergency basis without complying with the requirements of this chapter if:
(a) the facts known by the agency or presented to the agency show that
an immediate and significant danger to the public health, safety, or welfare exists; and
(b) the threat requires immediate action by the agency.
(2) In issuing its emergency order, the agency shall:
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(a) limit its order to require only the action necessary to prevent or
avoid the danger to the public health, safety, or welfare;
(b) issue promptly a written order, effective immediately, that includes
a brief statement of findings of fact, conclusions of law, and reasons for
the agency's utilization of emergency adjudicative proceedings; and
(c) give immediate notice to the persons who are required to comply
with the order.
(3) If the emergency order issued under this section will result in the continued infringement or impairment of any legal right or interest of any party,
the agency shall commence a formal adjudicative proceeding in accordance
with the other provisions of this chapter.

63-46b-21. Declaratory orders.
(1) Any person may file a request for agency action, requesting that the
agency issue a declaratory order determining the applicability of a statute,
rule, or order within the primary jurisdiction of the agency to specified circumstances
(2) Each agency shall issue rules that
(a) provide for the form, contents, and filing of petitions for declaratory
orders,
(b) provide for the disposition of the petitions,
(c) define the classes of circumstances in which the agency will not
issue a declaratory order;
(d) are consistent with the public interest and with the general policy
of this chapter; and
(e) facilitate and encourage agency issuance of reliable advice.
(3) (a) An agency may not issue a declaratory order if.
f
i) the request is one of a class of circumstances that the agency
has by rule defined as being exempt from declaratory orders; or
• ii) the person requesting the declaratory order participated in an
adjudicative proceeding concerning the same issue within 12 months
of the date of the present request
(b) An agency may issue a declaratory order that would substantially
prejudice the rights of a person who wpuld be a necessary party, only if
that person consents in writing to the determination of the matter by a
declaratory proceeding.
(4) Persons may intervene in declaratory proceedings if
(a) they meet the requirements of Section 63-46b-9, and
(b) thev file timely petitions for intervention according to agency rules.
(5) An agency may provide, by rule or order, that other provisions of Sections 63-46b-4 through 63-46b-13 apply to declaratory proceedings
(6) (a) After receipt of a petition for a declaratory order, the agency may
issue a written order
(l) declaring the applicability ot the statute, rule, or order in question to the specified circumstances,
ui) setting the matter ior adjudicative proceedings,
du) agreeing to issue a declaratorv order within a specified time;
or
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(iv) declining to issue a declaratory order and stating the reasons
for its action.
(b) A declaratory order shall contain:
(i) the names of all parties to the proceeding on which it is based;
(ii) the particular facts on which it is based; and
(iii) the reasons for its conclusion.
(c) A copy of all orders issued in response to a request for a declaratory
proceeding shall be mailed promptly to the petitioner and any other parties.
(d) A declaratory order has the same status and binding effect as any
other order issued in an adjudicative proceeding.
(7) Unless the petitioner and the agency agree in writing to an extension, if
an agency has not issued a declaratory order within 60 days after receipt of
the petition for a declaratory order, the petition is denied.
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UTAH ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ACT,
UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-35-1, et seq.
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34-35-1. Short title.
This shall be known and mav be cited as the "Utah Anti-Discriminatorv Act."
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34-35-2.

Definitions.

As used in this chapter:
(1) "Apprenticeship" means any program for the training of apprentices
including, but not limited to, any program providing the training of those
persons defined as apprentices by Section 35-8-5, whether or not such
program is registered and approved by the Apprenticeship Council under
Section 35-8-2.
(2) "Bona fide occupational qualification" means a characteristic applying to an employee which is necessary to the operation or is the essence of
his employer's business.
(3) "Commission" means the Industrial Commission of the state of
Utah, and "commissioner" means a member of that commission.
(4) "Coordinator" or "director" means the individual who manages the
enforcement of this chapter.
(5) "Court" means the district court in the judicial district of the state of
Utah in which the asserted unfair employment practice occurred, or if this
court is not in session at t h a t time, then any judge of the court.
(6) "Employee" means any person applying with or employed by an
employer.
(7) "Employer" means the state or any political subdivision or board,
commission, department, institution, school district, trust, or agent
thereof, and every other person employing 15 or more employees within
the state for each working day in each of 20 calendar weeks or more in the
current or preceding calendar year; but it does not include religious
organizations or associations, religious corporations sole, nor any corpo76
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ration or association constituting a wholly owned subsidiary or agency of
any religious organization or association or religious corporation sole.
(8) "Employment agency" means any person undertaking to procure
employees or opportunities to work for any other person, or the holding
itself out to be equipped to do so.
(9) "Handicap" means a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of a person's major life activities.
(10) "Joint apprenticeship committee" means any association of representatives of a labor organization and an employer providing, coordinating, or controlling an apprentice training program.
(11) "Labor organization" means any organization which exists for the
purpose in whole or in part of collective bargaining or of dealing with
employers concerning grievances, terms or conditions of employment, or of
other mutual aid or protection in connection with employment.
(12) "National origin" means the place of birth, domicile, or residence of
an individual or of an individual's ancestors.
(13) "On-the-job-training" means any program designed to instruct a
person who, while learning the particular job for which he is receiving
instruction, is also employed at that job, or who may be employed by the
employer conducting the program during the course of the program, or
when the program is completed.
(14) "Person" means one or more individuals, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, trusts or trustees, receivers, the
state of Utah and all political subdivisions and agencies of the state.
(15) "Presiding officer" means the same as t h a t term is defined in
Section 63-46b-2.
(16) "Prohibited employment practice" means a practice specified as
discriminatory, and therefore unlawful, in Section 34-35-6.
(17) "Retaliate" means the taking of adverse action by an employer,
employment agency, labor organization, apprenticeship program, on-thejob training program, or vocational school against one of its employees,
applicants, or members because he has opposed any employment practice
prohibited under this chapter or because he has filed charges, testified,
assisted, or participated in any way in any proceeding, investigation, or
hearing under this chapter.
(18) "Vocational school" means any school or institution conducting a
course of instruction, training, or retraining to prepare individuals to
follow an occupation or trade, or to pursue a manual, technical, industrial,
business, commercial, office, personal services, or other nonprofessional
occupations.
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34-35-3. J u r i s d i c t i o n of Industrial Commission — Creation of Antidiscrimination Division — Coo r d i n a t o r of fair employment practices.
The commission shall have jurisdiction over the subject of employment
practices and discrimination made unlawful by this chapter. There is hereby
created a division of the commission to be known and designated as the Utah
Antidiscrimination Division, which division shall be under the jurisdiction and
direction of the commission. The division shall have as its immediate supervisory head a co-ordinator of fair employment practices. Such co-ordinator
shall be appointed by the commission. Any co-ordinator so appointed shall at
all times be under the direct supervision and control of the commission.
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34-35-5

Antidiscrimination Division Advisory Committee — Membership — A p p o i n t m e n t — Term —
P o w e r s and duties — Chair.

(1) There is created an Antidiscrimination Division Advisory Committee of
not less than 11 nor more than 15 members appointed as follows:
(a) The governor shall appoint:
(i) one small business representative;
(ii) one employer representative;
(iii) one labor representative; and
(iv) one representative of the Utah State Bar.
(b) The governor shall appoint the remaining members:
(i) to represent each of the following protected classes: race, color,
national origin, gender, religion, age, and persons with disabilities;
and
(ii) to ensure equal representation on the board of employers and
employees.
(c) The director of the Utah Antidiscrimination Division shall be an ex
officio nonvoting member and provide any necessary staff support for the
committee.
(2) (a) Six of the initial committee members shall be appointed for a
two-year term beginning July 1 and ending J u n e 30. The remaining initial
committee members shall be appointed for one-year terms beginning July
1 and ending June 30. The first term to begin July 1, 1994.
(b) At the expiration of the term of a committee member or if a vacancy
occurs on the committee, the governor shall appoint a replacement to the
committee for a two-year term.
(c) The governor shall terminate the term of a committee member who
ceases to be representative as designated by the original appointment.
(3) A committee member shall serve without pay, but is entitled to necessary
expenses incurred in attending meetings called by the chair.
(4) (a) The advisory committee shall offer advice on issues requested by the
commission and the Legislature and also make recommendations to the
commission and division regarding issues of employment discrimination
and issues related to the administration of this chapter.
(b) The committee shall confer at least quarterly for the purpose of
advising the commission and the Legislature regarding issues of employment discrimination and issues related to the administration of this
chapter.
(5) The governor shall appoint a member of the committee to serve as chair.
The chair is charged with the responsibility of calling the necessary meetings.

34-35-5.

Antidiscrimination D i v i s i o n — P o w e r s .

(1) The Utah Antidiscrimination Division may:
(a) appoint and prescribe the duties of investigators and other employees and agents that it considers necessary for the enforcement of this
chapter;
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(b) adopt, publish, amend, and rescind rules, consistent with, and for
the enforcement of, this chapter;
(c) receive, reject, investigate, and pass upon complaints alleging discrimination in employment, apprenticeship programs, on-the-job training
programs, and vocational schools, or the existence of a discriminatory or
prohibited employment practice by a person, an employer, an employment
agency, a labor organization, or the employees or members of an employment agency or labor organization, a joint apprenticeship committee, and
vocational school;
(d) investigate and study the existence, character, causes, and extent of
discrimination in employment, apprenticeship programs, on-the-job training programs, and vocational schools in this state by employers, employment agencies, labor organizations, joint apprenticeship committees, and
vocational schools;
(e) formulate plans for the elimination of discrimination by educational
or other means;
(f) hold hearings upon complaint made against a person, an employer,
an employment agency, a labor organization or the employees or members
of an employment agency or labor organization, a joint apprenticeship
committee, or a vocational school;
(g) issue publications and reports of investigations and research that
will tend to promote good will among the various racial, religious, and
ethnic groups of the state, and that will minimize or eliminate discrimination in employment because of race, color, sex, religion, national origin,
age, or handicap;
(h) prepare and transmit to the governor, at least once each year,
reports describing its proceedings, investigations, hearings it has conducted and the outcome of those hearings, decisions it has rendered, and
the other work performed by it;
(i) recommend policies to the governor, and submit recommendation to
..employers, employment agencies, and labor organizations to implement
those policies;
(j) recommend any legislation concerning discrimination because of
race, sex, color, national origin, religion, age, or handicap to the governor
that it considers necessary;
(k) within the limits of any appropriations made for its operation,
cooperate with other agencies or organizations, both public and private, in
the planning and conducting of educational programs designed to eliminate discriminatory practices prohibited under this chapter; and
(1) adopt an official seal.
(2) The division shall investigate alleged discriminatory practices invoking
officers or employees of state government if requested to do so by the Career
Service Review Board.
(3) (a) In any hearing held under the authority of this chapter, the division
may:
(i) subpoena witnesses and compel their attendance at the hearing;
(ii) administer oaths and take the testimony of any person under
oath; and
(hi) compel any person to produce for examination any books,
papers, or other information relating to the matters raised by the
complaint.
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(b) Any of the following may conduct hearings:
(i) the commission;
(ii) any commissioner;
(iii) the coordinator; or
(iv) a hearing examiner or agent appointed by the commission.
(c) If a witness fails or refuses to obey a subpoena issued by the
commission, the commission may petition the district court to enforce the
subpoena.
(d) (i) No person may be excused from attending or testifying, or from
producing records, correspondence, documents, or other evidence in
obedience to a subpoena issued by the commission under the authority of this section on the ground that the evidence or the testimony
required ^ a y tend to incriminate him or subject him to any penalty or
forfeiture.
(ii) No person may be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or
forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing
concerning which he shall be compelled to testify or produce evidence
after having claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, except
that a person testifying is not exempt from prosecution and punishment for perjury.

34-35-6. Discriminatory or unfair employment practices
— Permitted practices,
(1) It is a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice:
(a) (i) for an employer to refuse to hire, or promote, or to discharge,
demote, terminate any person, or to retaliate against, harass, or
discriminate in matters of compensation or in terms, privileges, and
conditions of employment against any person otherwise qualified,
because of race, color, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related
conditions, age, if the individual is 40 years of age or older, religion,
national origin, or handicap. No applicant nor candidate for any job or
position may be considered "otherwise qualified," unless he possesses
the education, training, ability, moral character, integrity, disposition
to work, adherence to reasonable rules and regulations, and other job
related qualifications required by an employer for any particular job,
job classification, or position to be filled or created;
(ii) as used in this chapter, "to discriminate in matters of compensation" means the payment of differing wages or salaries to employees
having substantially equal experience, responsibilities, and skill for
the particular job. However, nothing in this chapter prevents increases in pay as a result of longevity with the employer, if the salary
increases are uniformly applied and available to all employees on a
substantially proportional basis. Nothing in this section prohibits an
employer and employee from agreeing to a rate of pay or work
schedule designed to protect the employee from loss of Social Security
payment or benefits if the employee is eligible for those payments;
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(b) for an employment agency:
(i) to refuse to list and properly classify for employment, or to
refuse to refer an individual for employment, in a known available job
for which the individual is otherwise qualified, because of race, color,
sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, religion,
national origin, age, if the individual is 40 years of age or older, or
handicap;
(ii) to comply with a request from an employer for referral of
applicants for employment if the request indicates either directly or
indirectly that the employer discriminates in employment on account
of race, color, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, religion, national origin, age, if the individual is 40 years of age
or older, or handicap;
(c) for a labor organization to exclude any individual otherwise qualified
from full membership rights in the labor organization, or to expel the
individual from membership in the labor organization, or to otherwise
discriminate against or harass any of its members in full employment of
work opportunity, or representation, because of race, sex, pregnancy,
childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, religion, national origin, age,
if the individual is 40 years of age or older, or handicap;
(d) for any employer, employment agency, or labor organization to print,
or circulate, or cause to be printed or circulated, any statement, advertisement, or publication, or to use any form of application for employment
or membership, or to make any inquiry in connection with prospective
employment or membership, which expresses, either directly or indirectly,
any limitation, specification, or discrimination as to race, color, religion,
sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, national origin, age, if the individual is 40 years of age or older, or handicap or intent
to make any such limitation, specification, or discrimination; unless based
upon a bona fide occupational qualification, or required by, and given to, an
agency of government for security reasons;
(e) for any person, whether or not an employer, an employment agency,
a labor organization, or the employees or members thereof, to aid, incite,
compel, or coerce the doing of an act defined in this section to be a
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice; or to obstruct or
prevent any person from complying with this chapter, or any order issued
under it; or to attempt, either directly or indirectly, to commit any act
prohibited in this section;
(f) for any employer, labor organization, joint apprenticeship committee, or vocational school, providing, coordinating, or controlling apprenticeship programs, or providing, coordinating, or controlling on-the-jobtraining programs, instruction, training, or retraining programs:
(i) to deny to, or withhold from, any qualified person, because of
race, color, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, religion, national origin, age, if the individual is 40 years of age
or older, or handicap the right to be admitted to, or participate in any
apprenticeship training program, on-the-job-training program, or
other occupational instruction, training or retraining program;
(ii) to discriminate against or harass any qualified person in that
person's pursuit of such programs, or to discriminate against such a
person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of such programs,
82

ANTI-DISCRIMINATORY ACT

34-35-6

because of race, color, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related
conditions, religion, national origin, age, if the individual is 40 years
of age or older, or handicap;
(iii) to print, or publish, or cause to be printed or published, any
notice or advertisement relating to employment by the employer, or
membership in or any classification or referral for employment by a
labor organization, or relating to any classification or referral for
employment by an employment agency, indicating any preference,
limitation, specification, or discrimination based on race, color, sex,
pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, religion, national origin, age, if the individual is 40 years of age or older, or
handicap except that a notice or advertisement may indicate a
preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination based on race,
color, religion, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, age, national origin, or handicap when religion, race, color, sex,
age, national origin, or handicap is a bona fide occupational qualification for employment.
Nothing contained in Subsections (l)(a) through (l)(f) shall be construed to
prevent the termination of employment of an individual who is physically,
mentally, or emotionally unable to perform the duties required by that
individual's employment, or to preclude the variance of insurance premiums, of
coverage on account of age, or affect any restriction upon the activities of
individuals licensed by the liquor authority with respect to persons under 21
years of age.
(2) (a) It is not a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice:
(i) for an employer to hire and employ employees, for an employment agency to classify or refer for employment any individual, for a
labor organization to classify its membership or to classify or refer for
employment any individual or for an employer, labor organization, or
joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or
other training or retraining programs to admit or employ any individual in any such program, on the basis of religion, sex, pregnancy,
childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, age, national origin, or
handicap in those certain instances where religion, sex, pregnancy,
childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, age, if the individual is 40
years of age or older, national origin, or handicap is a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise;
(ii) for a school, college, university, or other educational institution
to hire and employ employees of a particular religion if the school,
college, university, or other educational institution is, in whole or in
substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a
particular religious corporation, association, or society, or if the
curriculum of the school, college, university, or other educational
institution is directed toward the propagation of a particular religion;
(iii) for an employer to give preference in employment to his own
spouse, son, son-in-law, daughter, daughter-in-law, or to any person
for whom the employer is or would be liable to furnish financial
support if those persons were unemployed; or for an employer to give
preference in employment to any person to whom the employer during
the preceding six months has furnished more than one-half of total
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financial support regardless of whether or not the employer was or is
legally obligated to furnish support, or for an employer to give
preference in employment to any person whose education or training
was substantially financed by the employer for a period of two years
or more
(b) Nothing contained in this chapter applies to any business or
enterprise on or near an Indian reservation with respect to any publicly
announced employment practice of the business or enterprise under which
preferential treatment is given to any individual because he is a native
American Indian living on or near an Indian reservation
(c) Nothing contained in this chapter shall be interpreted to require any
employer, employment agency, labor organization, vocational school, joint
labor-management committee, or apprenticeship program subject to this
chapter to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group
because of the race, color, religion, sex, age, national origin, or handicap of
the individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist with
respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any race, color,
religion, sex, age, national origin, or handicap employed by any emplover,
referred or classified for employment by an employment agencv or labor
organization, admitted to membership or classified by any labor organization or admitted to or employed in, any apprenticeship or other training
program, in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of
t h a t race, color, religion, sex, age, national origin, or handicap in any
community or county or in the available work force in any community or
county
(3) It is not a discriminatory or prohibited practice with respect to age to
observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system or any bona fide employment
benefit plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan which is not a
subterfuge to evade the purposes of this chapter except that no such emplovee
benefit plan shall excuse the failure to hire any individual
(4) Notwithstanding Subsection (3), or any other statutory provision to the
contrary, other than Subsection (5) and Section 67-5-8, and except where age
is a bona tide occupational qualification no person shall be subject to
involuntarv termination or retirement from employment on the basis of age
alone if the individual is 40 years of age or older
(5) Nothing in this section prohibits compulsory retirement of an emplovee
who has attained at least 65 years of age, and who, for the two vear period
immediately before retirement, is employed in a bona fide executne or a high
pohc> making position, if t h a t employee is entitled to an immediate nonforfeitable annual retirement benefit from his employer's pension, profit sharing,
savings, or deferred compensation plan, or any combination of those plans,
which benefit equals in the aggregate, at least $44 000
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34-35-7.1. P r o c e d u r e for aggrieved person to file claim —
Investigations — Adjudicative proceedings —
Settlement — Reconsideration — Determination.
(1) (a) Any person claiming to be aggrieved by a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice may by himself, his attorney, or his agent, make,
sign, and file with the commission a request for agency action.
(b) Every request for agency action shall be verified under oath or
affirmation.
(c) A request for agency action made under this section shall be filed
within 180 days after the alleged discriminatory or prohibited employment practice occurred.
(2) Any employer, labor organization, joint apprenticeship committee, or
vocational school who has employees or members who refuse or threaten to
refuse to comply with the provisions of this chapter may file with the
commission a request for agency action asking the commission for assistance
to obtain their compliance by conciliation or other remedial action.
(3) (a) Before a hearing is set or held as part of any adjudicative proceeding,
the commission shall promptly assign an investigator to attempt a
settlement between the parties by conference, conciliation, or persuasion.
(b) If no settlement is reached, the investigator shall make a prompt
impartial investigation of all allegations made in the request for agency
action.
(c) The commission and its staff, agents, and employees shall conduct
every investigation in fairness to all parties and agencies involved, and
may not attempt a settlement between the parties if it is clear that no
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice has occurred.
(d) If the aggrieved party wishes to withdraw the request for agency
action, he must do so prior to the issuance of a final order.
(4) (a) If the initial attempts at settlement are unsuccessful, and the
investigator uncovers insufficient evidence during his investigation to
support the allegations of a discriminatory or prohibited employment
practice set out in the request-for agency action, the investigator shall
formally report these findings to the director.
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report, the director may issue a
determination and order for dismissal of the adjudicative proceeding.
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(c) A party may make a written request to the director for an evidentiary hearing to review de novo the director's determination and order
within 30 days of the date of the determination and order for dismissal.
(d) If the director receives no timely request for a hearing, the determination and order issued by the director becomes the final order of the
commission.
(5) (a) If the initial attempts at settlement are unsuccessful and the
investigator uncovers sufficient evidence during his investigation to support the allegations of a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice
set out in the request for agency action, the investigator shall formally
report these findings to the director.
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report the director may issue a
determination and order based on the investigator's report.
(c) A party may file a written request to the director for an evidentiary
hearing to review de novo the director's determination and order within 30
days of the date of the determination and order.
(d) If the director receives no timely request for a hearing, the determination and order issued by the director requiring the respondent to
cease any discriminatory or prohibited employment practice and to
provide relief to the aggrieved party becomes the final order of the
commission.
(6) In any adjudicative proceeding, the investigator who investigated the
matter may not participate in a hearing except as a witness, nor may he
participate in the deliberations of the presiding officer.
(7) Prior to commencement of an evidentiary hearing, the party filing the
request for agency action may reasonably and fairly amend any allegation, and
the respondent may amend its answer. Those amendments may be made
during or after a hearing but only with permission of the presiding officer.
(8) (a) If, upon all the evidence at a hearing, the presiding officer finds that
a respondent has not engaged in a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice, the presiding officer shall issue an order dismissing the
request for agency action containing the allegation of a discriminatory or
prohibited employment practice.
(b) The presiding officer may order that the respondent be reimbursed
by the complaining party for his attorneys' fees and costs.
(9) If upon all the evidence at the hearing, the presiding officer finds that a
respondent has engaged in a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice, the presiding officer shall issue an order requiring the respondent to cease
any discriminatory or prohibited employment practice and to provide relief to
the complaining party, including reinstatement, back pay and benefits, and
attorneys' fees and costs.
(10) Conciliation between the parties is to be urged and facilitated at all
stages-of the adjudicative process.
(11) (a) Either party may file a written request for review of the order
issued by the presiding officer in accordance with Section 63-46b-12.
(b) If there is no timely request for review the order issued by the
presiding officer becomes the final order of the commission.
(12) An order of the commission under Subsection lll)(a) is subject to
judicial review as provided in Section 63-46b-16.
(13) The commission shall have authority to make rules concerning procedures under this chapter in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah
Administrative Rulemaking Act.
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LABOR IN GENERAL

(14) The members of the commission and its staff may not divulge or make
public any information gained from any investigation, settlement negotiation,
or proceeding before the commission except in the following:
(a) Information used by the director in making any determination may
be provided to all interested parties for the purpose of preparation for and
participation in proceedings before the commission.
(b) General statistical information may be disclosed provided the identities of the individuals or parties are not disclosed.
(c) Information may be disclosed for inspection by the attorney general
or other legal representatives of the state 01 commission.
(d) Information may be disclosed for information and reporting requirements of the federal government.
(15) The procedures contained in this section are the exclusive remedy
under state law for employment discrimination based upon race, color, sex,
retaliation, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, age, religion, national origin, or handicap.
(16) The commencement of an action under federal law for relief based upon
any act prohibited by this chapter bars the commencement or continuation of
any adjudicative proceeding before the Utah Antidiscrimination Division in
connection with the same claims under this chapter. Nothing in this subsection
is intended to alter, amend, modify, or impair the exclusive remedy provision
set forth in Subsection (15).
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34-35-9.

J u d i c i a l e n f o r c e m e n t of d i v i s i o n findings.

(1) The commission or the attorney general at the request of the commission
shall commence an action under Section 63-46b-19 for civil enforcement of a
final order of the commission issued under Subsection 34-35-7.1(12) if:
(a) the order finds that there is reasonable cause to believe that a
respondent has engaged or is engaging in discriminatory or prohibited
employment practices made unlawful by this chapter;
(b) counsel to the commission or the attorney general determines after
reasonable inquiry that the order is well grounded in fact and is warranted
by existing law;
(c) the respondent has not received an order of automatic stay or
discharge from the United States Bankruptcy Court; and
(d) (P the commission has not accepted a conciliation agreement to
which the aggrieved party and respondent are parties; or
(ii) the respondent has not conciliated or complied with the final
order of the commission within 30 days from the date the order is
issued.
(2) If the respondent seeks judicial review of the final order under Section
63-46b-16, pursuant to Section 63-46b-18 the commission may stay seeking
civil enforcement pending the completion of the judicial review.
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EXHIBIT C
UTAH ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ADMINISTRATIVE RULES,
RULE 560-1, et seq.

ANTI-DISCRIMINATION

R560. Anti-Discrimination.
R560-1. Anti-Discrimination.
R560-2. Pre-Employment Inquiry Guide.
R560-3. Nondiscrimination Clause to be used in Contracts Entered into by the State of Utah and its
Agencies.
R560-4. Advertising.
R560-5. Employment Agencies.
R560-6. Regulation of Practice and Procedure on Employer Reports and Records.

R560-1. Anti-Discrimination.
R560-I-1. Authority.
R560-1-2. Definitions.
R560-1-3. Procedures—Request for Agency Action
and Investigation File.
R560-1-4. Procedures — Initial Decision Making and
Review.
R560-1-5. Classification of Proceeding for Purpose of
Utah Administrative Procedures Act.
Rf>60-l-(). Declaratory Orders.
R560-1-7. Time.
R560-1-1. A u t h o r i t y .
THis rule is established
34-35-2, U.C.A.

pursuant

to

Section

R560-1-2. Definitions.
The following definitions are complementary to the
statutory definitions specified in Section 34-35-2,
U.C.A..and shall apply to all rules of R560.
A. "Act" means the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act
of 1965. prohibiting discriminatory or unlawful employment practices.
B. "Charging partv" means the person who initiated agency action.
C "Commission" means the Industrial Commission
of Utah
I) "Director" means the Director, Utah Anti-Discnmination Division.
E. "Division" means the Utah Anti-Discrimination
Division.
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F "Handicap" means a physical or mental impair
ment which substantially limits one 01 more of an
individual's major life activities
1 Being regarded as having a handicap is equiva
lent to being handicapped or having a handicap
2 Having a record of an impairment substantially
limiting one or more major life activities is equiva
lent to being handicapped or having a handicap
3 Major life activity means functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking,
seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and
employment
4 An individual will be considered substantially
limited in the major life activity of employment or
working if the individual is likely to experience difficulty in securing, retaining, or advancing in employ
ment because of a handicap
5 Has a record of such an impairment means has a
history of, or has been regarded as having, a mental
or physical impairment that substantially limits one
or more major life activity
6 Is regarded as having an impairment means
a has a physical or mental impairment that does
not substantially limit major life activities but is
treated as constituting such a limitation,
b has a physical or mental impairment that sub
stantially limits major life activities only as a result
of the attitudes of others toward such an impairment
or
c has none of the impairments listed in the defini
tion of physical or mental impairment above but is
treated as having such an impairment
G "He, His, Him or Himself shall refer to either
sex
H "Investigator shall mean the individual desig
nated by the Commission or Director to investigate
complaints alleging discriminatory or prohibited em
ployment practices
I "Qualified handicapped individual' means a
handicapped individual who with reasonable accom
modation can perform the essential functions of the
job in question
J 'Reasonable accommodation For the purpose of
enforcement of these rules and regulations the follow
ing criteria will be utilized to determine a reasonable
accommodation
1 An employer shall make reasonable accommoda
tion to the known physical or mental limitations of an
otherwise qualified handicapped applicant or em
ployee unless the employer can demonstrate that the
accommodation would impose i n undue hardship on
the operation of its program
2 Reasonable accommodation mav include
a making facilities used bv the employees rcadilv
accessible to and useable bv handicapped individuals
and
b job restructuring modified work schedules ac
quisition or modification of equipment or devices and
other similar actions
3 In determining pursuant to Rule R560 1 2 J 1
whether an accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on the operation of an employer factors to
be considered include
a the overall size of the e m p l o \ e r s program with
respect to number of employees number and type of
facilities and size of budget,
b the type of the employers operation, including
the composition and structure of the employers work
force, and
c the nature and cost of the accommodation
needed
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4 An employer may not deny an employment opportunity to a qualified handicapped employee or applicant if the basis for the denial is the need to make
reasonable accommodation to the physical or mental
limitations of the employee or applicant
5 Each complaint will be handled on a case by-case
basis because of the variable nature of handicap and
potential accommodation
K The Division adopts the federal EEOC guidelines on sexual harassment as specified in 29 CFR
Section 1604 11
R560-1-3. Procedures—Request for Agency Action and Investigation File.
A CONTENTS OF REQUEST FOR AGENCY ACTION
A request for agency action as specified in Section
34-35 7 1, U C A , shall be filed at the Division office
on a form designated by the Division The completed
form shall include all information required by Section
63 46b 3(3), U C A
B FILING OF REQUEST FOR AGENCY ACTION
1 A request for agency action must be filed within
180 davs after the alleged discriminatory or prohibited employment practice occurred
2 A request for agency action shall be filed either
bv personal delivery or regular mail addressed to the
Divisions office in Salt Lake City, Utah
3 Investigators and any other persons designated
by the Commission, shall be available to assist in the
drafting and filing of requests for agency action at the
Division s office during normal business hours
C RESPONSE/ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR
AGENCY ACTION
1 The Division shall mail a copy of the request for
agencv action to the charging party and the respondent/employer within ten working days of the filing
of the request for agency action
2 The respondent must answer the allegations of
discrimination or prohibited employment practice set
out in the request for agencv action in writing within
ten working davs of receipt of the request for agency
action The response/answer shall be mailed to the
Division office
D AMENDMENT O r REQUEST FOR AGENCY
ACTION
1 All allegations of discrimination or prohibited
employment practice set out in the request for agency
action mav be amendeel, either by the Commission or
the charging party prior to commencement of an evi
dentiarv hearing and the respondent may amend its
answer Amendments made during or after an evi
dentiarv hearing mav be made onlv with the permis
sion of the presiding officer The Commission shall
permit liberal amendment of requests for agency ac
tion and filing of supplemental requests for agency
action in order to accomplish the purpose of the Act
2 Amendments or a supplemental request for
agencv action shall be in writing, or on forms fur
nished bv the Division signed and verified Copieb
shall be filed in the same manner as in the case of
original requests for agenc\ action
3 Amendments or a supplemental request for
agencv action shall be served on the respondent as in
the«case of an original request for agencv action
4 A request for agencv action or a supplemental
request for agencv action mav be withdrawn by the
charging pirtv prior to the issuance of a final order
L MAILING OF REQUEST FOR AGENCY AC
TION
The mailing specified in Section 63 46b 3(3),
U C A shall be pertormed bv the Division and the
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rsons known to have a direct interest in the reested agency action as specified in Section
53.46b-3(3)(b), U.C.A., shall be the charging party
and the respondent/employer
F CLASSIFICATION OF PROCEEDING FOR
PURPOSE OF UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT
pursuant to Section 63-46b-4(l), U.C.A , the procedures specified in Section 34-35-7 l(l)-(5), U.C.A., are
informal process with no hearing and are governed by Section 63-46b-5, U.C.A. Any settlement
conferences
scheduled
pursuant
to
Section
34 35-7 l(3)(a), U.C.A., are not adjudicative hearings.
G. PRESIDING OFFICER
for those procedures specified
in Section
34-35-7.l(l)-(5), U.C.A., the presiding officer shall be
the Director or the Director's designee. The presiding
officer for the formal hearing referred to in Section
34-35-7.1(6)-(11), U.C.A., shall be appointed by the
Commission.
R560-1-4. Procedures — Initial Decision Making
and Review.
The following rules pertain to the procedures specified in Section 34-35-7.1, U C A.
A. For purposes of requesting review of the initial
Determination and Order, the following provisions
and those of Section 63-46b-12. U C A., shall applv
1 The initial Determination and Order of the Division, after the completion of an investigation on a
charge of discrimination, shall be issued by the Director. The Director may request that the Commission's
legal staff review an investigatory file and make a
recommendation to the Director prior to the issuance
of the initial Determination and Order. The Director
may refer a request for agency action back to an investigator for further investigation when necessary.
2. Division Orders, referred to in Rule R560-1-4 A 1
as the initial Determination and Order, are not final
Commission Oiders until either the time to file a
written request to the Director for an evidentiary
hearing to review de novo the Director's Determination and Order has expired or until the Order is affirmed in a Commission Order on review per Section
63-46b-12, U C A
3 A request for an evidentiary hearing to review de
novo the Director's Determination and Order must be
in writing and submitted to the Director within 30
days oFthe date of the initial Determination and Order
4 A request for an evidentiary hearing must state
a reason why the hearing is necessarv A hearing will
not be considered necessary if the hearing will not
add to the evidence in the investigatory file or cause
the evidence in the investigatory file to be viewed
difierentlv In most cases, the need to cross-examine
the individuals who have submitted affidavits supportive of the initial finding or determination of the
Commission will be considered a valid reason for
granting a request for a hearing by the Commission
5 Either party may file a written request for review of the presiding officer's Order in accordance
with Section (>3-46b-12, U C A
B Where the complaint is one of handicap discrimination, whether risk of future injury or increased cost
of insurance coverage will be allowed as a defense to
handicap discrimination will be at the discretion of
the Division and shall be dealt with on a case-by-case
basis subject to the following limitations
1 The respondentyemployer seeking to use the defense of risk of future injury must provide reliable
medical evidence showing a causal connection be-
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tween the increased risk of future injury and the
handicap alleged to cause the increased risk.
2. The respondent/employer seeking to use the defense of increased cost of insurance premium must
show with verified documentary evidence that a significant insurance premium increase would occur if
the charging party were hired or remained in the
position at issue.
C. It shall be the practice of the Division to rely on
federal case law regarding discrimination in interpreting the Act in cases where the federal law being
interpreted by the courts closely parallels the Act and
where state law interpretation is non-existent.
R560-1-5. Classification of Proceeding for Purpose of Utah Administrative Procedures Act.
The adjudicative proceeding referred to in Section
34-35-7.l(6)-( 10), U.C.A., is a formal adjudicative
hearing which shall occur following the investigation
process referred to in Section 34-35-7. l(l)-(5), U.C.A.
The formal hearing shall be held after the Director
sends the request for an evidentiary hearing to the
Legal Counsel, who will ensure that the requirements imposed by Rule R560-1-4 A.3 and 4 have been
satisfied and that a formal hearing is necessary to
finally resolve the matter and when it is appropriate
pursuant to Section 63-46b-4(3), U.C.A.
R560-1-6. D e c l a r a t o r y O r d e r s .
A PURPOSE
As required by Section 63-46b-21, this rule provides the procedures for submission, review, and disposition of petitions for agency Declaratory Orders on
the applicability of statutes, rules, and Orders governing or issued by the agency.
B. PETITION FORM AND FILING
1. The petition shall be addressed and delivered to
the Director, who shall mark the petition with the
date of receipt.
2 The petition shall.
(a) be clearly designated as a request for an agency
Declaratory Order;
(b) identify the statute, rule, or Order to be reviewed,
(c) describe in detail the situation or circumstances
in which applicability is to be reviewed;
(d) describe the reason or need for the applicability
review, addressing in particular why the review
should not be considered frivolous;
(e) include an address and telephone where the petitioner can be contacted during regular work days,
(0 declare whether the petitioner has participated
in a completed or on-going adjudicative proceeding
concerning the same issue within the past 12 months;
and
(g) be signed bv the petitioner
C REVIEWABILITY
The agency shall not review a petition for a Declara t o r Order that is
1 not within the jurisdiction and competence of the
agencv,
2 trivial, irrelevant, or immaterial, or
3 otherwise excluded bv state or federal law.
D PETITION REVIEW" AND DISPOSITION
1 The Director shall promptly review and consider
the petition and m a y
(a) meet with the petitioner,
<b) consult with Legal Counsel, or
(c) take any action consistent with law that the
agency deems necessary to provide the petition adequate review and due consideration.
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2. The Director may issue an order pursuant to Section 63-46b-21(6), U.C.A.
E. ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW
Review of a Declaratory Order is per Section
63-46b-13, U.C.A., only.
R560-1-7. T i m e .
A. An Order is deemed issued on the date on the
face of the Order which is the date the presiding officer signs the Order.
B. In computing any period of time prescribed or
allowed by these rules or by applicable statute:
1. The day of the act, event, finding, or default, or
the date an Order is issued, shall not be included;
2. The last day of the period so computed shall be
included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a state
legal holiday, in which event the period runs until
the end of the next working day;
3. When the period of time prescribed is less than
seven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and
state legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation;
4. No additional time for mailing will be allowed.
1993
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EXHIBIT D
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER,
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n of Utah Anti-Discrimination Division and Felix Jensen

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lak0 County Utah

MAR 2 8 1994
By_L
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRI?$Uty C,erk
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 930905232

vs.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
DIVISION and FELIX JENSEN,
Defendants.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss was heard on March 7, 1994.
Plaintiff was represented by Glenn G. Hanni.

Defendants were

represented by Alan Hennebold. The Court read the Memoranda filed,
heard oral argument and took the matter under advisement.
Defendant

Felix

Jensen

had

filed

a discrimination

claim

against plaintiff and defendant Industrial Commission ruled in his
favor.

Plaintiff seeks a judicial review by trial de novo of the

Commission's ruling.
Defendants

Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed.

contend

that

plaintiff

had

not

exhausted

its

administrative remedies or filed its action for judicial review
timely.
The Court has reviewed Utah Code Ann., Sections 34-35-7.1, 3435-7.1(5), 34-35-7.1(11), and 63-46b-12, and has concluded that the
Commission has correctly interpreted the procedure that should be
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followed in the processing of claims such as the claim filed by Mr.
Stevens.

The Court does not believe that it was the intent of the

legislature to create a situation wherein an aggrieved party could
obtain a judicial review of a director's ruling without

first

having an evidentiary hearing to review de novo the director's
ruling.

It is evident that the legislature intended to create an

administrative body that had the expertise to adjudicate claims
without the necessity of resorting to the courts except to appeal
from a final adjudicative order.
The plaintiff's contention that there is a conflict between
the Anti-Discrimination Act and the Administrative Procedures Act
is a matter of interpretation on the part of the party who seeks to
avoid

the

consequences

procedure to be followed

of

the

Anti-Discrimination

Act.

The

in the Anti-Discrimination Act leaves

little doubt that an aggrieved party cannot allow 30 days to elapse
so as to

make the director's order to become a final agency action

which would allow for forum shopping between the Commission and the
courts.
adopted

If the aggrieved party does not follow the procedure
by the Commission, the aggrieved party

is barred

from

judicial review because the aggrieved party has failed to exhaust
its administrative remedies.
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The Court has not attempted to write an exhaustive Memorandum
because defendant's Memoranda adequately reflects the Court's views
on the issues presented in this case.
The Court did not deem it necessary to address the issue of
timeliness of plaintiff's filing its Complaint, because plaintiff
failed to request a hearing before the Commission,
Defendant shall prepare the Order in accordance with this
decision.
Dated this

day of March, 1994.

vyv^— A -k rz-kcJ1^
JOHN)A. ROKICH
"
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this

2Q

day of

March, 1994:

Glenn C. Hanni
Attorney for Plaintiff
9 Exchange Place, Sixth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Alan Hennebold
Attorney for Defendant Industrial Comm
P.O. Box 146600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6600
Felix E. Jensen
Pro se
2060 Brewer
Salt Lake City, Utah

84121

Lw<

&<MT
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FILED iK .ERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County Utah

APR 2 8 1994

Alan Hennebold-4740
General Counsel
Industrial Commission of Utah
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
P.O. Box 146600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6600
Telephone: (801) 530-6937

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,

By

AL

*bct
Deputy Clerk

*
*
*

Plaintiff,

*
*

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS

#

V3 •

~

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OP
UTAH ANTIDISCRIMINATION
DIVISION and FELIX JENSEN,

*
*
*

CASE NO. 930905232 CV

*

Defendants.

*
*

The Industrial Commission of Utah having moved to dismiss the
Complaint

of Plaintiff

State Farm Mutual Automobile

Insurance

Company, and the Court having received and reviewed the parties'
respective memoranda on that issue, and having further heard the
parties' oral argument in open court on March 7, 1994, and the
Court having then issued its Memorandum Decision on March 28, 1994,
granting Defendant Industrial Commission's Motion To Dismiss, it is
hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff State Farm Mutual
has failed to exhaust the administrative remedies provided by Utah
Code Ann. §34-35-7.1.
IT

IS

FURTHER

ORDERED,

ADJUDGED

AND

DECREED

that

as a

consequence of Plaintiff's failure to exhaust its administrative
remedies, this Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of
Plaintiff's Complaint.

Order Granting Motion To Dismiss
State Farm v. Industrial Commission
Case No. 930905232 CV

Page Two
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff's

Complaint in this matter is dismissed with prejudice.
DATED t h i s Jj^sday

of

/jagjj/

1994.

BY THE COURT:

OTOHty A. ROKICH
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

mi

Attorney for Plaintiff

ah\930905232
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EXHIBIT E
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER,
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n of Utah Anti-Discrimination Division and Brenda Mena

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

State Farm Mutual Automobile,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Industrial Commission of Utah
Anti-Discrimination Division and
Brenda Mena,
Defendants.

:
:
:
:
:

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CASE NO: 930905022 CV
JUDGE Frank G. Noel

:
:

The court has reviewed defendant's Motion to Dismiss together with the memos filed in
connection therewith, has heard oral argument and having taken the matter under advisement
now rules as follows:
The court grants the Motion to Dismiss on the ground of failure by plaintiff to exhaust
its administrative remedies. The court does so for the following reasons:
The court will not attempt a recitation of all the facts inasmuch as they are essentially
undisputed and are adequately recited in the memos filed by the parties. It is sufficient to simply
state that plaintiff, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (hereinafter "State Farm")
seeks judicial review of informal action taken by the Industrial Commission of Utah under the
Anti-Discrimination Act. (Section 4-35-1 et. seq. Utah Code Annotated as amended 1953.)
This statute sets out the procedure to be followed by an aggrieved party. In very general terms
it is basically a five step process as follows:
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Step 1:

A party claimed to be aggrieved files a request for agency action.

Step 2:

An investigator is appointed who attempts a settlement and reconciliation between
the parties.

Step 3:

If no settlement is reached then an informal investigation is conducted and the
director issues an order based on the results of the investigation.

Step 4:

An aggrieved party may then request an evidentiary hearing before a presiding
officer. (The procedure at this point ceases to be an informal process and
becomes a formal adjudication.)

Step 5:

Subsequent to the evidentiary hearing an aggrieved party may request a review
of the presiding officer's order within the agency as per the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act Section 63-46b-12.
The act further provides that judicial review of this process is available to those who have

filed a request for a review within the agency under Step 5 above.
State Farm elected to seek a de novo review by this court after the initial informal
investigation report and order by the director under Step 3 above. State Farm argues that up
to this point the proceedings are informal and that therefore it is entitled to seek judicial review
in this court under Section 63-46b-15, which provision vests this court with jurisdiction for de
novo review of final agency action resulting from informal proceedings.
This court is of the opinion that by not following all of the steps outlined in the AntiDiscrimination Act State Farm did not exhaust its remedies. It did not request an evidentiary
hearing, which was available to it, and thereafter request an intra agency review of the results
of that evidentiary hearing. State Farm argues that if it cannot choose to opt out of the statutory
procedure at the point where informal proceedings become formal then it will never be able to
get a de novo hearing in the District Court under Section 63-46b-15. The answer to this
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argument is that if the agency procedure provides the parties with an opportunity for an
evidentiary hearing at the agency level with the opportunity to present evidence, cross examine,
etc., and the hearing complies with the Administrative Procedures Act for formal adjudicative
proceedings resulting in an adequate record that is reviewable by the Supreme Court or the
Court of Appeals, then there is no need for a de novo review in District Court. That is the case
here.

The Anti-Discrimination Act establishes a specific, well thought-out, step by step

procedure. State Farm cannot elect to opt out along the way, allow the time to expire for
invoking its rights under the next step and thereby claim "final action" by the agency and then
seek judicial review.
State Farm points to Section 63-46b-15(l)(a) which provides:
"The District Courts shall have jurisdiction to review by trial de
novo all final agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative
proceedings...."
To interpret this provision as State Farm suggests however would create an inconsistency
with Section 63-46b-14 which provision codifies a fundamental tenet of administrative law that
parties are entitled to judicial review only after they have exhausted all administrative remedies.
This court is of the opinion that a better interpretation of 63-46b-15 and an interpretation
consistent with the exhaustion of remedies doctrine, under the facts of this case, is that there was
no final agency action inasmuch as the statutory procedure provided for further remedies
including the right to seek an evidentiary hearing. Section 63-46b-15, therefore, seems to
contemplate a situation where an aggrieved party has exhausted all of the remedies available to
it within a particular agency and that the final action of the agency is a culmination of informal

STATE FARM V. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

proceedings.

PAGE 4

MEMO DECISION

In that circumstance then there would be final agency action resulting from

informal adjudicative proceedings.
The Anti-IMscrimination Act itself provides specifically for judicial review after all of
the steps in its adjudicative process have been completed. Section 34-35-7. l(12)(a) provides:
"An order of the commission under subsection (ll)(a) [Step 5
above] is subject to judicial review as provided in Section 63-46b16." (Formal adjudications)
In Maverick v. Industrial Commission. 221 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, the Supreme Court held,
under this same statute, that if an aggrieved party did not take the final step of requesting review
of the evidentiary hearing then they would not be entitled to judicial review.
Accordingly, the court is of the opinion that State Farm has not exhausted its
administrative remedies and that therefore this court is without jurisdiction. In light of this
ruling the court does not feel it necessary to rule on the other issues presented in the Motion to
Dismiss.
Counsel for defendant is to prepare an order consistent with this ruling and submit it to
opposing Counsel for approval as to form and then to this court for signature.
Dated this ^

c ^ d a y of March, 1994.
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STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,

*
*
*

Plaintiff,

*
*

vs.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS

*
*

UTAH ANTIDISCRIMINATION
DIVISION and BRENDA MENA,

*
*
*

Defendants.

*
*

The Industrial Commission of Utah having moved to dismiss the
Complaint

of

Plaintiff

State Farm Mutual Automobile

Insurance

Company, and the Court having received and reviewed the parties'
respective memoranda on that issue, and having further heard the
parties' oral argument in open court on March 18, 1994, and the
Court having then issued its Memorandum Decision on March 22, 1994,
granting Defendant Industrial Commission's Motion To Dismiss, it is
hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff State Farm Mutual
has failed to exhaust the administrative remedies provided by Utah
Code Ann. §34-35-7.1.
IT

IS

FURTHER

ORDERED

ADJUDGED

AND

DECREED

that

as

a

consequence of Plaintiff's failure to exhaust its administrative
remedies, this Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of
Plaintiff's Complaint.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff's
Complaint in this matter is therefore dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this

day of

7, 1994.

BY THE COURT:

FKAJMK G. NOEL
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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Approved as to form:

Glenn C. Hanni
Attorney for Plaintiff
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CASE NO. 930905022 CV
*
*
*

Defendants.

The Industrial Commission of Utah having moved to dismiss the
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parties' oral argument in open court on March 18 f 1994, and the
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granting Defendant Industrial Commission's Motion To Dismiss, it is
hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff State Farm Mutual
has failed to exhaust the administrative remedies provided by Utah
Code Ann. §34-35-7.1.
IT

IS

FURTHER

ORDERED

ADJUDGED

AND

DECREED

that

as

a

consequence of Plaintiff's failure to exhaust its administrative
remedies, this Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of
Plaintiff's Complaint.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff's
Complaint in this matter is therefore dismissed with prejudice.
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, 1994
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